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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes a decision-making model based on PESTEL (Political, Economic, 
Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal) analysis, AHP (Analytical Hierarchical 
Process), and game theory. The case study used to demonstrate the concept is a 2013 
Malaysian crisis wherein foreign intruders occupied a village in Sabah state. The 
Malaysian government, ultimately, launched a military operation to clear the area.  
The focus of our study is the decision-making processes of the two rational actors 
in this case—the Malaysian Prime Minister and the Sultan of Sulu. Game theory and 
AHP provided structured framework for investigation, particularly in subjective 
assessment. Each player is assessed by a particular set of criteria independent from the 
other’s criteria. To support these tools, we analyze available literature to formulate 
PESTEL attributes, which could affect both parties’ payoffs in the construct. The 
combined application of these tools—PESTEL analysis, AHP, and game theory—
demonstrates how they mitigate each other’s weaknesses. The utility of this model is 
twofold: (1) it makes the analysis of decisions taken in the past more insightful; and (2) it 
provides a framework for choosing the optimal course of action when making a decision. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
PESTEL, AHP, and game theory are being widely used in the decision-making 
domain. All three, independently, have their unique strengths as well as some inherent 
limitations. This research offers a refined and improved decision-making model to 
resolve a conflict by combining these three proven decision-making tools. Combined, 
these three mitigate each other’s weaknesses and multiply each other’s strengths. Game 
theory is an interactive tool that works well in understanding conflicts and strategy 
formulation; but has limitations in allocating payoffs. AHP can be beneficial here in 
providing the payoffs. AHP, itself, is limited by its dependence on a more systematic 
approach in composing decision-making criteria. PESTEL can come to the rescue of 
AHP here. At the same time, AHP strengthens PESTEL’s weaknesses in quantifying the 
decision criteria.  
By selecting the Lahad Datu standoff of 2013 as a case study for the proposed 
model, the research offers valuable insights into the crisis through the interactive 
decision-making process’ perspective with consideration of macro environmental factors 
affecting both players (the Malaysian Prime Minister and Sultan Sulu). It also identifies 
key elements that influenced the action of both players. Moreover, this research provides 
a structural framework which can be effectively used for choosing the most appropriate 
course of action in any conflict situation. 
This chapter discusses the fundamental elements that drive and govern this study. 
In the context of a specific case study, this chapter lays out the analysis of the Malaysian 
government’s decision-making process with the combination of three contemporary 
decision-making tools—PESTEL analysis, game theory, and the Analytical Hierarchical 
Process (AHP).   
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY 
Before  going into the specifics of the incident under evaluation, the Lahad-Datu 
standoff of 2013, it is important for the purpose of clarity to orient ourselves with the 
geography of Malaysia, as well as to introduce the different actors or groups in this case 
 1 
 study. Malaysia primarily consists of two parts—the Malaysian peninsula (to the West), 
and the state of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo island (Figure 1) (Fernandez, 1998).  
  
Figure 1. General map of the region studied (from Lewis & Geelan, 
1994). 
The rest of Borneo Island (Kalimantan) belongs to Indonesia. Brunei lies as an 
independent country between the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah. The 
Philippines lies to the northeast of Sabah (Fernandez, 1998). There are many small 
islands in this region belonging to Malaysia as well as the Philippines (including Sulu 
Archipelago) (Meinhardt et al., 1999). Our point of interest is the region in the northeast 
of Sabah and the Philippines islands of Sulu Archipelago (Figure 2). The population of 
Sabah is multi-ethnic including a minority population of Suluk people, also known as 
Tausug. They are originally from Sulu Archipelago, where they have their own so-called 
Sulu Sultanate. The sultan (Sultan Sulu) lays claim to the whole of Sabah calling it a part 
of his Ancestral Kingdom of Sulu (“Sultanate of Sulu,”  n.d.).  
 2 
  
Figure 2. Sulu Archipelago (from Meinhardt et al., 1999). 
On February 11, 2013, about 100 to 300 armed Tausug from Sulu Archipelago 
infiltrated the Northeastern part of Sabah. The invaders identified themselves as Royal 
Security Forces of Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo, and occupied a village called 
Tanduo (Figure 3) in Lahad Datu, Sabah (Zachariah, 2013). The Sulu Sultan Jamalul 
Kiram III confirmed that the invasion was led by his brother, Crown Prince Abgimuddin 
Kiram, and had instructions to proclaim their ancestral right over the disputed Sabah 
(Chooi, 2013a). They claimed they did not intend to initiate any hostilities, unless forced 
to use arms in self-defense. The intruders did not harm the villagers and allowed them to 




Figure 3. Tanduo village (from Aziz, 2013). 
This was the first incident of external armed forces invading Malaysia since the 
Ganyang Malaysia (crush Malaysia) campaign by Indonesia in 1965. The area was 
besieged by Malaysian Security Forces led by the Inspector General of Police, and 
backed by other agencies such as the Malaysian Armed Forces, and Malaysian Coast 
Guard. The intruders were offered by the Malaysian government to leave Malaysian soil 
peacefully by February 27, 2013 (Poling et al., 2013). Despite the request from the 
Philippine government and several extensions in the deadline given by the Malaysian 
government, the intruders held their ground in Tanduo. While the intruders held their 
ground, this incident caused some social distress among the Lahad Datu population, the 
exchange of cyber-attacks between Malaysian and Philippine citizens (as the invaders 
were Philippine citizens), concern for the safety of Philippine immigrant workers, and a 
disturbance in domestic business in Malaysia (“Lahad Datu Invasion,” 2013).  
The standoff lasted for nearly three weeks. On March 1, 2013, the first gunfire 
was exchanged killing twelve intruders and two Malaysian Police Commandos. 
Moreover, an ambush on police in Lahad Datu village resulted in the death of eight 
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 policemen and six Tausugs. On March 5, 2013, the Malaysian prime minister announced 
the commencement of Ops Sulu-Daulat, which was essentially the green light for a 
military assault on the besieged red zone of Kampung Tanduo (“Ops Sulu Bermula,” 
2013). During the campaign, Malaysian security forces had mobilized 5610 troops, 
fighter jets, helicopters, mortars, and armored personnel carriers (Kamavoz, 2013). The 
operation was officially ended on March 15, 2013, with Malaysian losses amounting to 
ten security personnel killed and a financial cost of almost RM85 million (Zakariah, 
2013). Meanwhile, the intruders’ losses were 68 dead and 173 arrested (Kamavoz, 2013).   
This research explored PESTEL analysis, game theory, and the Analytical 
Hierarchical Process to assess the decision process of the Malaysian government in 
responding to the Lahad-Datu standoff in 2013. AHP provided the structural framework 
for subjective assessment and quantification of the subjective analysis (Saaty, 1990). In 
support of AHP, the criteria for the decision making were based on an environmental 
approach analysis—PESTEL analysis. Media reports and other relevant literature were 
collected and analyzed based on Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environment 
and Legal (PESTEL) attributes that highlighted the critical criteria that affected both 
parties’ payoff in the game theory (Said, 2002; Yuksel, 2012). By using the game theory 
model, each party was potentially assessed by a particular set of criteria independent from 
other party’s criteria which led to a more suitable, precise and transparent criteria. The 
game theory model also provided the opportunity to assess each rational player with the 
influence of his opponent’s possible strategy (Straffin, 1993). The result helped us in 
better understanding the dynamics behind the Malaysian prime minister’s decision to use 
force in Ops Sulu-Daulat. This decision-making model demonstrated the viability of 
combined PESTEL, AHP, and game theory application in deciding a course of action in 
any conflict. 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the viability of the combined 
application of three decision-making tools—PESTEL, AHP and game theory—to provide 
the framework for an effective decision-making model. 
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 The objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To demonstrate the viability of the combined application of PESTEL, 
AHP, and game theory as a model of decision making in any conflict. 
2. To explore the probable justification of the Malaysian government’s 
decision to forcefully respond to the invasion of Sabah by the non-state 
actors. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research was driven by the following questions: 
1. Can PESTEL analysis, AHP, and game theory be effectively fused to 
propose a viable decision-making framework? 
2. Can this proposed model help us better comprehend the dynamics behind 
the decision-making process of the Malaysian prime minister in this crisis? 
3. Could the Malaysian government avoid use of force and amicably resolve 
the conflict by peaceful means? 
4. Could the intruders avoid use of force in the given scenario?  
Based on these research questions, the thesis intends to test the following 
hypotheses: 
1. H1:  PESTEL analysis, AHP, and game theory can be effectively fused 
to propose a viable decision-making framework. 
2. H2: This proposed model can help us to better comprehend the 
dynamics behind the decision-making process of the Malaysian prime 
minister in this crisis. 
3. H3: Malaysian government could not avoid the use of force. 
4. H4: The invaders could not avoid use of force in the given scenario. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope and limitations of this study are as follows:  
1. For purpose of simplicity, we considered two key players in this case 
study: the Prime Minister of Malaysia (Prime Minister), and Sultan 
Jamalul Kiram III (Sultan Sulu). While the PESTEL analysis considered a 
number of internal and external actors—which directly or indirectly 
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 influenced these players—the game theoretical part evaluated the 
interaction between the key players only.  
2. The decision-making timeframe is during the negotiation period, and not 
later than February 27, 2013. 
3. Both players’ strategies were constrained by a number of factors. While 
the sultan wanted to internationalize and highlight the outstanding sultan’s 
claim of Sabah, the Malaysian government has been pursuing a no-
negotiation policy—both with the sultan and the Philippine government. 
Moreover, there is no clear representation of Suluk people with there 
being more than one claimant to the title of Sultan Sulu The strategy is 
only focused on actions after the negotiation period offered by the 
Malaysian government to the intruders ended. With these constraints in 
mind, the strategies are limited as shown in Table 1. 
 
Players Strategies 
Prime Minister of Malaysia 1. Besiege the area and continue the negotiations to 
convince the intruders to leave Sabah peacefully. 
2. Assault by security forces, and arrest the 
intruders. 
Sultan Jamalul Kiram III’s Sultan Sulu 1. Surrender unconditionally, and leave for Sulu 
peacefully. 
2. Dig in and fight. 
Table 1. Both players’ strategies. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A combination of game theory, AHP, and PESTEL analysis were employed to 
analyze the Malaysian Prime Minister’s decision-making process against the intruders. 
Game theory is a useful tool in analyzing interactive decision-making process, but lacks 
in credibility in assigning payoffs or quantitative representation of judgment (Said, 2002). 
AHP is incorporated to compensate the Game theory’s weaknesses, as AHP is well 
known as a credible tool that could offer a quantification unit and translate qualitative 
criteria into a quantitative judgment (Ishizaka et al., 2011). We further enhanced our 
accuracy in this research by employing PESTEL analysis to complement the AHP 
criteria. PESTEL analysis provides the macro environmental framework in structuring 
our search for the criteria of decision making (Bensoussan and Fleisher, 2008). An 
overview of the research design is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Research design flowchart.  
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of Sulu Sultan 
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to produce payoff 
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 F. METHODOLOGY 
The research began by identifying the decision-making objective for both players. 
The objective of this decision-making process was to select the best course of action for 
both players to resolve the conflict. PESTEL model analysis was conducted to understand 
the situation comprehensively to support the decision-making process. In this research, 
PESTEL analysis procedures were adapted from the steps suggested by Bensoussan and 




1 Defining the general scope of individual PESTEL elements 
2 Selecting events to be analyzed 
3 Relating the event to the issue 
4 Forecasting the impact of the event on the issue 
5 Clustering events as decision criteria 
Table 2. PESTEL analysis framework. 
In our research, the first step was to provide an overview of the general scope of 
individual PESTEL elements. The second step was to identify relevant issues and events 
that could impact the objective of decision making. Relevant data was collected from 
open sources like newspapers, magazines and other publications of the time, as nothing 
confidential was available from official sources. This helped us to narrow down the 
general scope to specific events that we could take into account. In essence, this was a 
stricter definition of boundaries considering the conjectural nature of analysis. For 
example, the whole political analysis was segmented into domestic, regional, and global 
political spheres. Domestic politics were further limited to the upcoming general 
elections, as all political matters, in the mind of the prime minister, cannot be objectively 
accounted for. In the third step, these relevant issues or events were analyzed to justify 
their relevance on the players’ judgment. For example, the prime minister’s political 
stakes in the elections made the elections a relevant consideration for any decision 
making in this case study. The fourth step was analyzing the impact of these events on 
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 the Lahad-Datu crisis. The last step was to catalog the events into possible concern 
criteria that could influence the decision-making process of the players. The decision 
criteria developed in PESTEL model analysis were used as the basis of decision criteria 
development in AHP analysis.   
Table 3 displays the steps in AHP model analysis adapted from Moore & 
Weatherford (2001), and the software developed by Fox (2013). The AHP analysis 
started by structuring the decision-making process with the identified objective and 
formulation of decision criteria based on the PESTEL analysis, followed by development 
of weight of criterion and local weight of alternate, or COA, and synthesis ranking by the 
usage of an Excel program developed by Professor Fox (Fox, 2013). Fox’s Excel 
program is validated by entering the same relative preference for each criterion with an 
intensity of one, which gives the same payoff result for each criterion with an overall sum 
of 1 (e.g., for four criteria/alternates, each should have a payoff or weight of 0.25). The 
result was the global weight of payoff for each criterion. These payoffs were later used as 
outcome payoffs of both players in the game theory analysis. A sensitivity analysis was 
also carried out to observe the ability of the model to manage to an “if” input. This was 
done by changing different possible degrees of variables in AHP analysis, which 
subsequently could alter the payoff in game theory.  
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 Steps Details 
1 Structuring the decision-making process. 
• Identifying objectives 
• Formulating decision criteria (data provided from PESTEL analysis) 
• Formulating sub decision making criteria (if required) 
2 Developing weight for each criterion by software. 
• Developing matrix of pair-wise relative preference and intensity 
• Consistency measurement 
• Normalization 
3 Developing local weight for each alternate by software. 
• Developing matrix of pair-wise relative preference and intensity 
• Consistency measurement 
• Normalization 
4 Synthesis Ranking by software.  
Calculating global weight (multiplying respective local weight within the same decision 
criteria) 
Table 3. AHP analysis framework. 
After completing the AHP process, the payoffs were keyed into the game theory 
analysis shown in Table 4. This model is based on Professor Giordano’s (2013) DA 4410 
class on modeling using game theory, and software developed by Feix (2007). Players are 
already determined from the start of the process, which are the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia (as Prime Minister) and Sultan Jamalul Kiram III (as Sultan Sulu). The payoffs 
for outcomes were provided from the AHP and keyed into the Feix software. As the 
payoff generated from the AHP model is an interval scaling (cardinal values), the 
research focuses on non-zero sum solution by utilizing Partial Sum Strategic Moves, 
security level and Nash Arbitration to analyze the best strategy to be adopted by both 
players. Partial Sum Strategic Moves provide the analysis in step 4 in the game theory 
model; meanwhile, step 6 provides security level and Nash Arbitration payoffs (as shown 
in Table 4).  
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 Steps Actions 
1 Determine players 
2 Determine their strategies 
3 Determine payoffs for conjecture outcome (input from AHP model) 
4 Analysis (if applicable) 
• Likely outcome (conservative maximin) without communication 
• Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium 
• Maximin (conservative) Pure strategy 
• Strategic Move 
5 If total conflict games (constant sum/zero sum): may be resolved by using mixed strategy 
solution 
6 If partial conflict games (non-zero sum): may be resolved by arbitration,  
• Security level 
• Nash Arbitration 
Table 4. Game theory framework. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction consisting 
of the problem statement, purpose, objective, scope and significance of the study, 
research question, and research design framework. Chapter II focuses on the literature 
review of the concerned decision-making tools. Chapter III contains the PESTEL analysis 
and discussion. Chapter IV contains AHP analysis and discussion. Chapter V contains the 
game theory analysis and discussion. Chapter VI is the conclusion of the thesis, 
containing a review of our findings, as well as suggestions for additional applications and 
further research on the proposed combined decision-making methodology. 
This chapter has identified the problem statement, purpose, objectives, scope, and 
significance of this research. It has also laid out the framework for this research and the 
organization of the thesis. Chapter II covers a detailed literature review of PESTEL, AHP 
and game theory. 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines the literature on the decision-making tools employed in 
this research. The focus of this chapter is to provide academic background for the 
proposed decision-making model. 
A. DECISION-MAKING TOOLS FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 
“Conflict is strategic interaction; the actions of both sides determine whether war 
occurs, and actors in international crises choose their actions in part for the anticipated 
effect of those actions on others” (Morrow, 1997, p. 11). Morrow (1997) asserts that 
game theory is the appropriate tool to understand conflict. Game theory was introduced 
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 as the science of interactive decision making 
(Zagare and Slantchez, 2009). It is a rational and logical analysis of situations of conflict 
(Straffin, 1993). Straffin (1993) further explains that the parameters of the game are as 
follows: 
1. There must be at least two players in the game. These could be persons, 
organizations, nations or a system. 
2. Each player must have more than one strategy to choose from. 
3. The strategy chosen will determine the outcome of the game. 
4. The outcome is associated with numerical payoffs as values to the 
outcome.  
 
Myerson (1991) stated that game theory assumes that the players are rational and 
intelligent. The player should make a decision that maximizes his expected output utility. 
The player is also intelligent in the sense that he knows about the operation of the game 
(Myerson, 1991, pp. 3–5). Zagare and Slantchez (2009) suggested that there are three 
conceptual devices used in the conflict literature to capture the strategic structure of a 
game. The concepts are as elucidated as follows:  
1. A game tree is used to represent a game in the extensive form. This is 
typically used in the analysis of two, and sometimes, three-person games. 
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 2. A payoff matrix is the basis of the normal or strategic form of 
representation. It is typically used in the analysis of two, and sometimes, 
three-person games. 
3. A mathematical function that assigns a payoff to every player and to every 
combination of players is known as the characteristic function of 
representation. The form is most frequently encountered when an n-person 
game is under consideration. 
The idea of game theory is to provide the decision maker the best solution to 
resolve a conflict. In a non-zero-sum, game three main interactions are considered to 
produce the solution, when there is no communication between both players; when there 
is interaction with communication that involves commitment, promise, and threat; and 
arbitration between both players to resolve to have a fair game (Straffin, 1993, p. 65).  
The basic setup of a non-zero-sum game matrix of 2x2 is depicted in Figure 5 
(Straffin, 1993). In this example, two players, Rose and Colin, are entangled in a conflict. 
Both players have two strategies each. Interactions of both players produce four 
outcomes. These outcomes are represented by payoff values as shown in Figure 5. The 
higher value means higher payoff. Payoff for Rose is the first value for each box and the 
second value is for Colin. For example, in Outcome 1, value 2 is Rose’s outcome and 
value 3 is Colin’s outcome. In this game, each player will maximize his outcome as a 
response to the other player’s strategy. Rose will move vertically, as shown by blue 
arrows (e.g., Payoff 1 moves to payoff 2 or payoff 0 moves to payoff 3) and Colin will 
move laterally, as shown by red arrows (e.g., Payoff 0 moves to payoff 1 or payoff 2 
moves to payoff 3). The example in Figure 6 also shows that both players have a 
dominant strategy where both players have only one preferred strategy in response to 
other player’s strategy. In this example, Nash Equilibrium is achieved at box Outcome 3 
(3, 3) because it has only incoming arrows (Straffin, 1993, p. 66). 
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  Colin 
Strategy 1  Strategy 2 
Rose 
Strategy 1 Outcome 1  Outcome 3 
    
Strategy 2 Outcome 2  Outcome 4 
Figure 5. Non-zero-sum-game 2 x 2 matrix setup. 
 Colin 
Strategy 1  Strategy 2 
Rose 







Strategy 2 1,0 
 
0,1 
Figure 6. Example of 2 x 2 Non-zero-sum-game matrix. 
Non-zero-sum game also accommodates for the cooperative game of arbitration. 
Nash arbitration will be based on Nash’s axioms which are rationality, linear invariance, 
symmetry, and invariance. The main objective of the arbitration game is to achieve 
fairness (Straffin, 1993). Any solution for arbitration game should be Pareto optimal and 
at or above the security level for both players (Straffin, 1993, p. 103). Security level is the 
safest payoff for the player to engage with arbitration. The game will proceed by playing 
each player’s payoffs separately. The player whose payoffs are being analyzed will 
maximize his payoff while the opponent minimizes the other player’s outcome. As a 
result, a status quo (SQ) and negotiation set for arbitration will be produced for both 




 Game theory has weaknesses in allocating payoffs. Said (2002) reported that even 
though game theory offers a useful approach to the framework of interactive decision 
making in strategic problems, priority should be given in the estimation of the payoffs, 
especially when the problems are dominated by qualitative considerations. Game theory 
cannot directly allocate a quantitative pay off for qualitative criteria. Said’s study shows 
that AHP can be used to mitigate the payoffs’ discrepancy in game theory. AHP can 
provide the quantitative payoffs for game theory (Said, 2002). 
B. ANALYTICAL HIERARCHICAL PROCESS (AHP) 
AHP, developed by Thomas L. Saaty, an operations researcher, is a methodology 
for structuring complexity, measurement, and synthesis. It is based on a mathematical 
structure of consistent matrices and their associated eigenvector’s ability to generate true 
or approximate weight (Saaty, 1990). Saaty (1990, p. 23) states that the benefits of AHP 
are as follows: 
1. Unity: easily understood and flexible  
2. Complexity: Integrates deductive and systems approaches in solving 
complex problems  
3. Interdependence: deals with interdependence of elements and does not 
insist on linear thinking  
4. Hierarchical Structuring:  Inherent natural tendency of human thinking   
5. Measurement:  Provides a scale for measuring intangibles and establishing 
priorities  
6. Consistency: Tracks logical judgments in determining priorities  
7. Synthesis: Leads to overall estimates of each player’s alternative  
8. Tradeoffs: Considerations of relative priorities of factors in a system  
9. Judgment and consensus: Synthesizes outcomes from diverse judgments, 
not just consensus  
10. Process Repetition: Enables people to refine and improve judgment 
through repetitions  
AHP is chosen in a situation that requires structuring, measurement and synthesis. 
It was used to resolve problems of choice in a multi-criteria or multi-objective 
environment which involves qualitative and quantitate factors (Forman and Gass, 2001; 
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 Babu & Sharma, 2005). Ishizaka et al. (2011) also suggested that AHP is an adequate 
support decision tool in many decision problems and, especially, problems incorporating 
a dominant criterion. Forman and Gass (2001) reported that AHP has gained acceptance 
by many academicians and practitioners, but it has also opened numerous academic 
discourses and debates. Most of the debates have been about AHP axioms, principals, 
transitivity, and rank reversal (Warren, 2004). All of this notwithstanding, wide usage of 
AHP in numerous fields has validated AHP as an acceptable decision-making tool. 
Numerous papers reported that many organizations, such as government agencies, 
hospitals, military, universities, and the private sector, have benefited from AHP as a 
decision tool. They used it in highway projects, fishery and forestry management, air 
traffic system, marine research, the medical and healthcare fields, the telecommunication 
industry, benchmarking, quality management, public policy, defense, strategic planning, 
and supplier and product selection (Forman and Gass, 2001; Muralidran, et al., 2002; 
Cebi and Bayraktar, 2003;  Ishizaka et al., 2011). 
AHP principles are governed by four axioms. The first is the reciprocal axiom, 
which states that if an objective or alternate A is five times more important than B, B then 
has one-fifth the importance relative to A. The second is the homogeneity axiom. The 
third is the synthesis axiom, which states that the priorities of an element do not depend 
on a lower-level element in a hierarchy. The fourth is that individuals who have reasons 
for their beliefs should make sure that their ideas are adequately represented for the 
outcome to match the expectations (Forman and Gass, 2001). 
Basic principles of AHP are the foundation of this technique to solve complex 
problems. They are decomposed by hierarchical structuring, comparative judgment by 
ratio scale measurements, logical consistency, and synthesis of priority (Saaty, 1990; 
Babu & Sharma, 2005). The summary of the AHP framework is shown in Table 5. 
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 Steps Details 
1 Identify objective. 
2 Identify criteria for evaluation. 
3 Decompose criteria to sub-criteria (if required). 
4 Develop weight for each criterion. 
• Matrix of pair-wise relative preference and intensity 
• Consistency measurement 
• Normalization 
5 Develop local weight for each alternate. 
• Matrix of pair-wise relative preference and intensity 
• Consistency measurement 
• Normalization 
6. Synthesis Ranking  
• Calculate global weight (Multiplying respective local weight within the same decision 
criteria) 
Table 5. AHP Framework 
Hierarchical structuring is known as the most powerful method of classification 
by the human brain in ordering experience, observation, entities, and information. An 
organization will intuitively choose the hierarchical form when facing a complex 
problem-solving situation, and when communicating power among organizational 
members (Saaty, 1990). A problem is broken down into a hierarchy in order to capture its 
basic elements. General information is broken downward to the next level of criteria for 
more specific information. AHP uses this principle in breaking up objectives to levels of 
specific criteria, where the bottom level is the alternative from whatever choice is to be 
made (Babu & Sharma, 2005).  
Figure 7 shows the hierarchy of evaluation and selection of two alternatives with 
two criteria. The Objective level contains the objective of the evaluation. The Level 1has 
three criteria to be evaluated, which is Political, Cost and Social; and the alternative level 
has two decision alternatives namely Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 for each criterion to 
be evaluated in respect to criteria in level 1. 
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Figure 7. Hierarchical structure of selection. 
There are four types of measurement scales, nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio 
(Saaty, 1990). These scales are arranged in ascending order where the latter has the 
properties of the scale before it. Ratio scale is the most dominant, as it has the properties 
of all scales. Saaty (1990) used pairwise comparison to derive preference to the local 
ratio scale that is used as local weight or ranking priorities with respect to their parent. 
Ratio scale is used in all levels of the hierarchy, including the alternative level. Forman 
and Gass (2001) argued that ratio scale, produced by AHP, had to make AHP more 
powerful than other methodologies using ordinal and interval measures. Table 6 shows 









 Measurement Scale 
Numerical 
Rating 




9 A is Extremely Preferred 
over B 
The judgment in favor of one activity over another is of 
the highest possible order of affirmation. 
7 Very Strongly Preferred Conclusive judgment as to the importance of one activity 
over another. 
5 Strongly Preferred The judgment is to strongly favor one activity over 
another. 
3 Moderately Preferred The judgment is to favor one activity over another, but it 
is not conclusive. 
1 Equally Preferred Two activities contribute equally to the objective. 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values 
between the two adjacent 
judgments 




If activity i has one of the above non zero numbers assigned to it when compared to 
activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared with i. 
Table 6. Ratio scale of AHP (from Saaty, 1990). 
Originally, comparison was done by using eigenvector (Saaty, 1990). Today, 
calculation for comparison, normalized value, and consistency are done by using a 
spreadsheet program (Fox, 2014; Moore & Weatherford, 2001). Two tables will be 
assigned for each criterion vs. criterion and each alternative vs. each alternative by 
criterion. They are the Comparison Matrix and Normalized Matrix.   
The basic procedure for comparison is as follows: 
1. Developing a pairwise comparison matrix for every criterion with respect 
to their parent in every level. 
2. Normalizing the resulting matrix. 
3. Averaging the values in each row to get the corresponding rating. 
4. Calculating and checking the consistency ratio. 
Table 7 shows an example of a comparison matrix of three criteria. In the 
comparison matrix, criteria will be evaluated based on the relative importance or 
preference between two criteria. The measurement scale is using ratio scale as shown in 
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 Table 8. In this example, the Political (row) is two times more preferred when compared 
to the Cost (column). Reciprocally, the Cost (row) is two times less preferred than the 















Political 1 2 3 
Cost 1/2 1 2 
Social 1/3 1/2 1 
Table 7. Pairwise matrix (after Saaty, 1990). 
The consistency of the pairwise matrix or Consistency Ratio (CR) will be 
determined through the software. Table 8 shows an example of the consistency ratio 
outcome from the software. The CR should be below 0.10 for the comparison in the 







Table 8. The Consistency Ratio result. 
After completing the pairwise activity, a sum of the scores for each column is 
then transferred to the normalized matrix to calculate the average value for each criterion. 
This process will be automatically done by the software. Table 9 shows an example of the 
average value of each criterion calculated by the software. 
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Table 9. Average value of the criterion. 
Synthesis allows us to rank alternatives by producing total average or global 
weight. These are achieved by multiplying the respective local weights of each level with 
global weight with respect to their parent element (Moore & Weatherford, 2001). 
Figure 8 shows an example of local weight for three alternatives with three 
criteria. For example, the weight for Political is 0.545 and the weight for Alternative 1 
under the Political criterion is 0.545. The calculation of global weight for this decision 
making hierarchy of Figure 8 is depicted in Table 10. For example, the global weight for 
Alternative 1 is 0.465 from the sum of 0.297 + 0.144 + 0.024. In this example, 
Alternative 1 was ranked in first position followed by Alternative 2 and Alternative 3. 




Figure 8. Structure for criteria and decision alternative.  
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(b x e) 
Local weight Multiply 
(b x g) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Political  0.545 0.545 0.297 0.287 0.156 0.168 0.092 
Cost 0.287 0.500 0.144 0.292 0.084 0.208 0.060 
Social 0.168 0.143 0.024 0.571 0.096 0.286 0.048 
Global weight  0.465  0.336  0.200 
Ranking  1  2  3 
Table 10. Summary of global weight in synthesis of rating. 
C. PESTEL ANALYSIS 
PESTEL analysis is a variant of PEST (Political, Economic, Social, and 
Technology) and is similar to SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats) analysis that provides a framework for understanding the environmental factors 
that could impact associated decisions. PESTEL provides a framework of analysis that 
addresses issues of a political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environmental, 
and legal nature (Bensoussan & Fleisher, 2008, pp. 169‒171).  
Although this type of analysis is commonly used in business and marketing 
strategy decision making, the framework could also be used for identifying and 
organizing issues (Holcombe & Johnston, 2008, pp. 37‒58). Holcombe and Johnston 
(2008) report using PESTEL in their analysis on The Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting (PPB) system to satisfy the nation’s policy objective. The weaknesses in 
PESTEL analysis are that PESTEL lacks a measurement and evaluation dimension 
(Yuksel, 2012). Yuksel (2012) suggested that AHP can be used to quantify the PESTEL 
analysis. The fusion works both ways. At the same time, PESTEL analysis provides a 
defined scope of analysis for the AHP model, which would also be the scope for the 
whole framework of the research. 
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 Bensoussan and Fleisher (2008, pp. 175‒179) suggested that PESTEL analysis 
should start with the definition of environmental boundary, followed by five processes in 
addressing each segment of PESTEL, which include: 
1. Understand the key events and trends of the segment in reference to the 
issue.   
2. Understand the relation of trend. 
3. Relate trend to issue. 
4. Forecast future direction of events or trends. 
5. Derive implication of the events or trends to organization—negative, 
positive or neutral impacts. 
This chapter has briefly discussed the theories underlying the selected decision-
making tools. It also highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each tool, in addition to 
highlighting the possibility and logic of jointly using these tools to mitigate the 
weaknesses of each. Chapter III will explain the employment of these tools by combining 
them into a model. The idea is that game theory can be supplemented by AHP by 
providing payoffs; meanwhile, PESTEL analysis can be used to provide scope and 
criteria for the AHP decision-making model. These tools complement each other in order 
to provide an effective decision-making framework. 
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 III. PESTEL MODEL ANALYSES 
This chapter explains the PESTEL analysis of the two players in this case study, 
and focuses on the prime minister’s and sultan’s macro environment. PESTEL analysis 
involves looking at political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal 
factors influencing the two players. The focus is to produce main concerns of each player 
during this crisis. 
A. PESTEL ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER’S 
CONCERNS 
Overall, as the following analyses reveal, the Prime Minister of Malaysia faced 
the greatest challenges from domestic demands and reactions to his decisions. While he 
had the support of the international community, he had to consider how his decisions 
would impact upcoming elections and Malaysia’s relationship with its regional 
neighbors, particularly the Philippines. Furthermore, he had to consider the economic 
consequences of escalation, a prolonged conflict, relief efforts for refugees and the 
impact of the conflict on eco-tourism. 
1. Political Analysis 
The political considerations for the prime minister can be subdivided into 
domestic, regional and global political factors. The most prominent event in Malaysia’s 
domestic politics during the Sulu intrusion was the upcoming thirteenth general elections. 
The government, led by Prime Minister Najib Abd Razak, was yet to confirm the date for 
the elections (Muis et al., 2012). Prime Minister Najib Abd Razak had to dissolve 
parliament on April 28, 2013 and hold the general elections within 60 days (Kate & 
Porter, 2013). The elections were expected be the most fiercely contested in Malaysian 
history. The previous general elections in 2008 had shown a new trend of the electorate, 
which had not been witnessed by Malaysians since 1959 (Nehru & Tran, 2013). In the 
twelfth general elections, the present ruling party, Barisan National or National Front 
(BN)—a coalition of numerous mainstream parties in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and 
Sarawak—led by Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, was challenged by the first 
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 significant opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat or People’s Coalition comprised of Parti 
Keadilan Rakyat or People’s Justice Party, Parti Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Islamic 
Party and Parti Tindakan Demokratik or Democratic Action Party, led by the former 
deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim. Astonishingly, BN lost its two-thirds 
parliamentary majority in the national legislature, and thus its power to amend the 
constitution, as well as five of thirteen state elections (Muis et al., 2012; Nehru & Tran, 
2013). Interestingly, Nehru and Tran (2013) reported that even though BN won the 
general elections and Najib Tun Razak formed the government based on a first-past-the-
post electoral system, PR won 47 percent of the popular vote. Figure 9 shows the popular 
vote percentage of opposition gained in three consecutive general elections (Nehru & 
Tran, 2013). It shows that the opposition alliance had increased their popular vote in the 
previous general elections. This development was a real threat to the ruling party.    
 
Figure 9. The popular vote (from Nehru & Tran, 2013) 
 26 
 The consensus among many political commentators appeared to be that BN’s 
majority was going to be eroded further in the 2013 elections due to a variety of national 
issues, such as Malay domination, the rise in the cost of living, government transparency, 
and efficiency (Nehru & Tran, 2013). Under the Najib administration, Nehru and Tran 
(2013) reported that Prime Minister Najib Razak’s approval rating remained above 60 
percent, but the BN coalition was less popular, with an approval rating of 45 percent, due 
to allegations of corruption and cronyism. Lamb (2013) observed that in a Merdeka poll, 
young Malaysian voters aged 21 to 30 were also unhappy with the prime minister’s 
performance. This was alarming for the governing coalition, as out of 13.3 million 
registered voters in the thirteenth general elections, almost a quarter were under the age 
of 25, with more than 3 million Malaysians voting for the first time (Lamb, 2013). 
Furthermore, Muis et al. (2012) reported that PR succeeded in maintaining the popular 
momentum when it won eight out of 13 small elections after the twelfth general elections. 
The government’s image was further tarnished by Malaysia’s ranking in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, which saw Malaysia slip steadily over the 
years from 25 in 1995 to 56 in 2013 (Nehru & Tran, 2013). Moreover, a Global Witness 
report on land grabs in the state of Sarawak highlighted the systemic corruption that 
appears to permeate all levels of government in Malaysia, and the Royal Commission 
Inquiry (RCI) on the illegal award of national identity cards to immigrants (especially to 
Filipinos) had significantly damaged the government’s reputation and efforts at 
reformation (Nehru & Tran, 2013). The RCI issue was critical to Malaysians as the 
allegations could expose the reality of transparency in the Sabah electoral process as the 
government was accused of manipulating the identification card award system in order to 
win the 2008 elections (Kate & Porter, 2013). 
Throughout the Sulu crisis, all Malaysians including the opposition parties 
unanimously supported the government’s action against intruders of Malaysian 
sovereignty (“After 15 Days,” 2013). Amid the show of solidarity in this crisis, both the 
government and opposition parties accused each other of sponsoring the intruders or 
getting political mileage from the situation. Opposition parties accused the government of 
staging the crisis as they thought the government had staged the 1999 al Mauna 
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 incident—which also occurred just before the previous general elections—in order to 
divert the people’s attention away from the RCI and Amalillio scandal (“Armed 
Filipino,” 2013). For its part, the government accused the opposition parties of being 
involved in the Sulu crisis with an aim to make the government coalition partner 
(UMNO) lose the Sabah vote (“It’s a Plot,” 2013). Figure 10 reveals that the government 
alliance had strong support in Sabah in the 2008 general elections (Nehru & Tran, 2013).    
 
Figure 10. State election seats won by the opposition alliance (from 
Nehru & Tran, 2013). 
The government alliance was troubled that this incident could affect support from 
the Sabah population. Rumors circulated that Prime Minister Najib even wanted to use 
this issue as a justification to postpone the thirteenth general elections. Opposition parties 
also blamed the prime minister for weak leadership in handling the conflict, especially 
after Malaysian security forces suffered casualties (Kate & Porter, 2013). Government 
supporters argued that this was highly unlikely because the government would not have 
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 liked to delay the elections at a time when its popularity was falling. Furthermore, the 
government could benefit from the conflict because if the government was successful in 
driving out the invaders, it could boost the ruling coalition’s chances in the elections. 
Even if the fighting continued, people might have rallied around the government as a 
show of solidarity in a time of crisis (Poling et al., 2013). Nevertheless, pressure built up 
on the government as the public was frustrated by the fact that Filipino gunmen infiltrated 
Sabah so easily. This reinforced the suspicion that Sabah’s immigration and security 
policies are intentionally lax to allow for easy election-rigging, as suggested by the RCI 
on illegal immigrants (Kate & Porter, 2013).  
Meanwhile, on the regional political front, general elections were also to be held 
in the Philippines on May 13. Mindanao had 11.4 million voters which made up a quarter 
of the Philippine’s total voters (Kate & Porter, 2013). Any unpopular move by the 
Philippine government in handling this crisis could cost them the election. Nevertheless, 
the Philippine President had shown his commitment to cooperate with the Malaysian 
government by urging the sultan to withdraw his men from Sabah peacefully. He also 
threatened to take stern action against the intruders and hold the sultan responsible for the 
incursion (Poling et al., 2013). Furthermore, the Philippine government was unlikely to 
interfere in Malaysia’s internal affairs as both states are members of the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which aims to “promote perpetual peace, everlasting 
amity and cooperation among their peoples, which would contribute to their strength, 
solidarity, and closer relationship.” Article 2 of the Treaty stipulates the consensus of the 
contracting parties to respect territory and national sovereignty and the right to repulse 
the external interference, subversion or coercion. Article 13 stipulates that all contracting 
parties shall refrain from use of force to settle disputes but seek friendly negotiations 
(“Treaty of Amity,” 2014).   
The acting Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor Mujiv 
Hataman, Tawi-Tawi Governor Badikul Sahali; Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan; 
Maguindanao Governor Ismael Mangudadatu; Basilan Governor Jum Akbar; and Lanao 
del Sur Governor Mamintal Adiong, Jr. issued a statement in a press conference in 
Greenhills, San Juan, Monday to urge the intruders to leave Sabah in peace. Even though 
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 they honored the right of the Sultanate to claim Sabah, they urged the Sultanate to adhere 
to international rules and protocol in pursuing its claim. They also raised the concern over 
the fate of thousands of Filipinos who had earned their living peacefully over the years 
and who might be caught up in the conflict (“ARMM Governors,” 2013).  
Other important players in the region are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). MILF and MNLF are the main 
separatist groups in the south of Mindanao that fight for Mindanao liberation from the 
Philippines. Originally they were in the same group, but in 1996 MILF separated from 
MNLF because of the formation of ARMM. MILF viewed ARMM as a sign of 
submission to the government of the Philippines. Former leader and founder of MNLF 
and former Governor of the ARMM Government in 1996‒2002, Misuari, had sworn to 
join the fight if the Malaysian government decided to launch an assault against the 
intruders. Back in 2002, Misuari was accused of killing 100 people in the MNLF attack 
of Army headquarters in Jolo, Sulu. As a fugitive he was captured by Malaysian security 
forces in Sabah and extradited to the Philippines (“Nur Misuari as ARMM,” 2013). 
Contrary to Misuari’s threat, the present leader of MNLF, Muslimin Sema, disapproved 
of the intrusion and had ordered his men not to interfere in the crisis (“MNLF 
Condemns,” 2013).  
Both MNLF and MILF leadership had declared that the crisis should be settled by 
Malaysian and Philippine authorities and they would not interfere in the crisis (Chooi, 
2013a). MILF, which is the biggest separatist group in Mindanao, is also involved in the 
Bangsamoro Peace Treaty negotiations with the Philippine government. These 
negotiations were championed by the Malaysian government to end the armed conflict in 
Mindanao. This treaty is to replace the ARMM government that has been established in 
1996. The Bangsamoro Peace Treaty aims to strengthen the ARMM and promote peace 
in Mindanao (Chooi, 2013a; “Nur Misuari as ARMM,” 2013). MILF believed that the 
treaty was too valuable to be jeopardized by the crisis (Poling et al., 2013). At the same 
time, Sultan Kiram and Misuari were known to oppose the treaty negotiations as they felt 
sidelined, especially on the claim of Sabah status (Kate & Porter, 2013). Both of them 
were accused of staging the standoff to derail the Bangsamoro Peace Agreement (Chooi, 
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 2013). Pitlo (2013) argued that the incident was a form of protest against Malaysian 
involvement in the Bangsamoro Peace Agreement in which Malaysia had a crucial self-
interest, especially in the Sabah claim by the Sultanate of Sulu and Government of the 
Philippines. He also reported that MNLF fighters could easily penetrate Sabah because 
the long coastline of Sabah presented a natural challenge to the Malaysian coastal patrol 
and the MNLF’s fighters were familiar with the area as they once received their training 
in Sabah under Malaysian sponsorship after the disclosure of Philippine’s Operation 
Merdeka, and Jabidah massacre in 1967. In such a situation, the chances of any material 
support from MNLF, MILF or the Philippine government were very bleak (Pitlo, 2013).   
Sultan Sulu also requested the United States of America, Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation and United Nations to intervene in the crisis. The Sultan urged the U.S. to 
honor the 1915 Kiram-Carpenter Agreement, which concluded that the “U.S. colonial 
government will provide full protection to the Sultan of Sulu should the question of 
Sabah arise in the future between the Sultanate and any foreign authority.” The U.S. 
ambassador to the Philippines rejected the request and believed that the Malaysian 
government had the credibility and legitimacy to settle the problem (Chooi, 2013b). 
Meanwhile, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation did not make any comment on this 
issue and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon only issued a statement that requested 
all parties to uphold international human rights standards and seek a peaceful resolution 
(“OIC, UN,” 2013 and Quismundo, 2013). In general, the international community did 
not have any issue with Malaysia taking action against the armed intruders, as it was seen 
as an act to defend her sovereignty. But there was much concern in Malaysia about 
possible human rights violations, free media access and the disproportionate use of force 
over a small number of intruders (Pitlo, 2013).  
2. Economic Analysis 
Sabah, which has economic importance for Malaysia, had been doing well 
economically before this crisis. The Chief Minister of Sabah claimed that Sabah’s 
economic growth during 2007 through 2012 was fairly high, with an annual growth rate 
of 4.7 percent, compared to the national annual growth rate of 4.3 percent (“Opening 
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 Remarks,” 2013). Oxford Business Review also reported that the local agency RAM 
Rating reaffirmed the AAA rating of the state government’s bond for a fourth 
consecutive year. Between January and September 2012, the state saw investment of RM 
4.8 billion, which was the second highest among Malaysian states (“Economy Update 
Sabah” (2013). Sabah also made RM 16.75 billion worth of palm oil exports and is 
regarded as the world’s third largest producer of palm oil (“Opening Remarks,” 2013). 
Borneo Post Online reported that investment in Palm Oil Industrial Cluster (POIC) in 
Lahad Datu alone reached RM 4.5 billion and creates 2,238 jobs (“Lahad Datu POIC,” 
2012). Lahad Datu is also considered as a potential top tourism attraction as it offers eco-
tourism, and local products based on marine, forestry, and agriculture. Lahad Datu hosts 
Ulu Segama Malua Forest Reserve where rare species of flora and fauna, such as the 
Borneo Pygmy Elephant, Borneo Sumatran Rhinoceros, Orang Utan and wild orchid, are 
found, and Tabin Wildlife Park which has a mud volcano. Lahad Datu also offers 
beautiful islands and favorite destinations for scuba divers, such as Pulau Mabul and 
Pulau Perhentian (Noordin, 2012). The apparent economic potential of Sabah makes it all 
the more important for the Malaysian government to uphold her right over Sabah, and the 
effort shown in developing the state is the testimony of the Malaysian government’s 
interest and determination. 
The crisis could adversely affect Sabah’s, and in turn, the Malaysian economy. 
The Star Online reported that Malaysian Rating Corp Berhad’s chief economist Nor 
Zahidi Alias believed that the crisis initially affected local businesses such as retail and 
tourism, but it could hit the Malaysian economy if the crisis escalated and was prolonged. 
Local businesses, tourism, fishing, and palm oil plantation activities within the hot zone, 
were most affected by the crisis as Malaysian security forces cordoned off the area from 
land and sea (“Lahad Datu Invasion,” 2013).  
Internal refugees were an economic burden and there were human displacement 
costs. Even providing relief to the affected people was taxing the Malaysian economy. 
Besides sanitation, husbandry and medical care, according to Berita Harian Online, the 
Malaysian Civil Defence Force (JPAM) commander Kolonel Abdul Wahab Rahim said 
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 that they spent RM 30,000 for food for three days in two relocation centres (“Ops Daulat 
JPAM,” 2013).  
The cost of mobilization of forces also had its impact on the Malaysian economy. 
In a Parliament session, Datuk Seri Hisyammudin, the Defense Minister, said that 5610 
security personnel were deployed and RM 84.9 million were spent (Izwan, 2013). As a  
result, if the crisis continued to linger on, it could adversely affect the economy, increase 
the anxiety of the affected people, and seriously dent public support for the government 
coalition in the coming general elections, especially in Sabah constituencies. 
3. Social Analysis 
The Sabah Department of Statistics Director told the RCI that, according to the 
2010 census, there were 889,000 foreigners in Sabah, which comprised 28 percent of its 
population (Su-Lyn, 2013). Sabah is home to many ethnicities having roots in Mindanao, 
including the Suluk or Tausug and the family of the Sultanate, who are citizens of 
Malaysia. Poling et al., 2013 reported that there are about 800,000 Filipinos living and 
working in Sabah and many of them are poor and undocumented. Utusan online reported 
that the Secretary of Rumpun Etnik Suluk Sabah, or the Sabah Suluk Ethnic Cluster, 
Mohd Zaki Harry Susanto, claimed there were more than 300,000 Suluk in Malaysia 
registered with the Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara or State Registration Department (“Suluk 
Sabah,” 2013).  
Mohd Zaki also expressed that the provocation by the sultan was uncalled for and 
uncivilized. He believed that most Suluk living in Sabah support the Malaysian 
government and their allegiance is to the Yang Dipertuan Agung, Head of Malaysia. He 
claimed that his people had also participated in the creation of Malaysia and their most 
celebrated leaders in the event were Tun Datu Mustapha who was the first Head of State 
and former Chief Minister of Sabah, and at present, Yang Dipertuan Negeri or the head 
of the Sabah state, Tun Juhar Mahirudin (“Suluk Sabah,” 2013; Luping, 2011).  
There are indications that some members of the royal family of Sulu also 
disapproved of the intruders’ action. This was natural considering the many factions 
within the family. Suara Islam reported that in an interview with Habib Muhammad 
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 Rizieq bin Husein Syihab, the grand mufti elected by Sultan Bantilan Mu’izzudin II 
explained that in the past Sultan Sulu had been inherited from the descendants of Sultan 
Azimuddin I and his brother Sultan Badaruddin I (“Filipina di Balik,” 2013). In 1962, 
Sultan Ismail Kiram I, the descendant of Sultan Azimuddin I, was recognized as the 
official Sultan of Sulu by the Philippine government. Later, he signed an agreement 
transferring the right of Sabah and Sulu to the Philippine government. The present Sultan 
of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram III, is the descendant of Sultan Ismail Kiram I, but at the same 
time Sulu has another sultan from the descendants of Sultan Mu’izzuddin I—Sultan 
Bantilan Mu’izzudin II. Habib Muhammad Rizieq claimed that Sultan Bantilan is the true 
Sultan of Sulu because he was elected through the consensus of Datus, Syarifs, scholars, 
prominent figures and the people of Sulu at the Rumah Bicara conference. Unlike Sultan 
Kiram, Sultan Bantilan disapproved of the agreement with the Philippine and Sabah 
claim status. During the crisis, the grand mufti and other representatives of Sultan 
Bantilan held a meeting with the Malaysian Defense Minister to resolve the crisis. The 
representatives also expressed Sultan Bantilan’s views about Malaysia, which he 
considered as a good brother Muslim country that had always helped the Sulu people in 
the past (“Filipina di Balik,” 2013). 
Apparently, the majority of residents in Sabah, including the Suluk, disapproved 
of the incursion on Sabah by the Tausug. So, no material support could be expected by 
the intruders from the Sabah residents. However, any wrong move by the security forces 
against ethnic Suluk and Philippine immigrants could be seen as persecution, which 
could jeopardize the government’s chances of winning in the coming elections. Even 
worse, improper social handling of the issue could muster support for the intruders. 
4. Technological Analysis 
The Malaysian security forces’ strength was far superior to that of the intruders in 
terms of numbers and weaponry. It was reported that the intruders were equipped with 
rifles only (Chooi, 2013a; Kamavoz, 2013). Nevertheless, the Malaysian security forces’ 
challenge was to prepare for escalation of the crisis. It was imperative to react with the 
appropriate level of force to confront the uncertainty of escalation. The Malaysian 
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 government had also mobilized civil defense assets, such as the Jabatan Pertahanan 
Awam Malaysia (JPAM) or Malaysia Civil Defense Department, to take care of the 
civilians involved. Mainly these civilians were the 1,520 villagers of Kampung Tanduo, 
Tanjung Labian, Sungai Bilis, Tanagian, Sungai Merah, Lok Buani and Sinakut. They 
had taken refuge in public halls such as Embara Budi, Cendrawasih, Gemala Putra and 
Fajar Harapan in Felda Sahabat 16 for their security, and for easy access to the relief 
delivery system (“Ops Daulat JPAM,” 2013; “Kenyataan Media,” 2013). JPAM 
coordinated the relief efforts by providing cooked food, basic sanitary facilities, medical 
facilities, public security, information and counselling (“Kenyataan Media,” 2013).  
The Malaysian government also mobilized the mobile information unit to relay 
security directives to the public through loudspeakers. The Department of Information 
also set up a media center for representatives to access information on the crisis, and for 
holding government media conferences. On the whole, there was no considerable worry 
for the prime minister in the realm of technology. 
5. Environmental Analysis 
The area of Felda Sahabat is a palm oil plantation area owned by the government 
agency, Felda (“Stay Away,” 2013). Any environmental degradation caused by the 
military operation could affect the palm oil exports of Malaysia. Moreover, there were 
also chances of the eco-tourism being adversely affected in the case of a large scale 
military operation.  
6. Legal Analysis 
The public was concerned with the government’s decision to negotiate with the 
intruders to leave peacefully, as they wanted them to be brought to justice according to 
Malaysian law. The Malaysian law mandates death sentence for crimes of murder, 
treason, robbery with firearms, terrorism-related offences and possession of fire arms 
(Koshy, 2013). In a somewhat similar incident in the year 2000, nineteen people from the 
al Ma’unah cult posed as army officers to steal more than 100 rifles and ammunition. In 
the process two security forces personnel were killed. These criminals were later 
convicted under the Malaysian Penal Code for waging war against the King or Head of 
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 State (Yang Dipertuan Agung). Three of them were sentenced to death (“Death Penalty,” 
2001).  
In 2012, Malaysia passed the bill of Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 
(SOSMA) to repeal the Internal Security Act of 1960. SOSMA is aligned with the Penal 
Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act of 1950, which covered offences 
against state and offences related to terrorism (Aingkaran Kugathasan, 2013). The 
Inspector of Police had also announced that the intruders would be investigated under the 
Securities Offenses (Special Measures) Act and Section 130(c) of the Penal Code 
concerning acts of terrorism, Malaysiakini reported (“IGP,” 2013). This created a 
disincentive for the intruders to lay down their arms as they feared a death sentence from 
the Malaysian legal system. 
As discussed earlier, the global and regional players and institutions had no legal 
issues with Malaysia taking action against the intruders. So, the prime minister did not 
face any tangible concern in this regard. However, there was pressure on him from the 
populace to bring the intruders to justice. 
B. PESTEL ANALYSIS OF SULTAN SULU’S CONCERNS 
In the following analyses, the focus is on the key factors that would impact the 
sultan’s decisions. These are primarily the political and economic factors, and to a lesser 
degree, the legal consequences of invading Lahad Datu. The Malaysian security forces’ 
equipment was far superior to that of his men. The intruders were only equipped with 
rifles and small firearms (Chooi, 2013a). So, the sultan had no technological 
considerations during this crisis. Similarly, environmental concerns did not influence his 
decision making. 
1. Political Analysis 
The Sulu Sultan claimed that the Sabah is the Sultanate of Sulu’s inheritance. He 
maintained that the main purpose of the crisis was to claim the ancestral land that rightly 
belonged to the Sultanate. This claim had been a dormant claim made by the Philippines 
over Malaysia based on the Sultanate of Sulu’s heritage which is part of present day 
 36 
 Philippines. In 1962, Sultan Ismail Kiram I, the forefather of Sultan Jamalul Kiram III, 
was recognized as the official Sultan of Sulu by the Philippine government. Later he 
signed an agreement transferring the right of Sabah and Sulu to the Philippine 
government (“Sultanate of Sulu,” n.d.) and “Filipina di Balik,” 2013). After the failed 
attempt to destabilize Malaysia in Operation Merdeka that ended with the Jabadiah 
massacre and diplomatic retaliation from Malaysia, President Marcos decided not to press 
the Philippines’ claim on Sabah in order to restore regional stability. Sultan Jamalul 
Kiram III denounced the Philippine government’s decision and blocked the move 
legislatively (Abd Samad, 2013).  
In the past, the Sulu sultanate had been inherited from the descendant of Sultan 
Azimuddin I and his brother, Sultan Badaruddin I. In 1962 Sultan Ismail Kiram I, who 
was a descendant of Sultan Azimuddin I, was recognized as the official Sultan of Sulu by 
the Philippine government and transferred the right of Sabah and Sulu to the Philippine 
government. At present there is no official sultan of Sulu. Besides Sultan Jamalul Kiram 
III, who was the descendant of Sultan Ismail Kiram I, there are other royal family 
members of Sulu who have claimed to be the rightful Sultan of Sulu, such as Sultan 
Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I and Sultan Bantilan Mu’izzudin. Sultan Muhammad 
Fuad is the descendant of Sultan Ismail Kiram I, and Sultan Bantilan Mu’izzudin II is the 
descendant of Sultan Mu’izzuddin I (“Sultanate of Sulu,” n.d. and “Filipina di Balik,” 
2013). Sultan Bantilan declared himself the true Sultan of Sulu because he was elected 
through the consensus of Datus, Syarifs, scholars, prominent figures and the peoples of 
Sulu at the Rumah Bicara conference. Unlike Sultan Jamalul Kiram I, Sultan Bantilan 
disapproved of the agreement with the Philippine and Sabah claim status and disapproved 
of the incursion on Lahad Datu. (“Filipina di Balik,” 2013).  
Malaysia has maintained her right to Sabah based on the Cessation Agreement of 
1878 between the British North Borneo Company and the Sultanate of Brunei and Sulu, 
and the right of the residents of Sabah to exercise their self-determination when they 
voted to join the Federation of Malaysia in 1969 (Poling et al., 2013). On the hand, the 
Sultanate of Sulu views the cessation as a temporary rental as the Malaysian government 
continues to pay the family equivalent to 5300.00 Mexican pesos annually. He also 
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 demands that Malaysia should increase the rent amount to at least 10 percent of Sabah’s 
GDP or return Sabah to the Sulu people (Medina and Cayabyah, 2013; Poling et al., 2013 
and “Sabah is an issue,” n.d.). 
In a recent development, the Philippine government has entered into a peace 
arrangement with the largest group of Islamic separatists (MILF) to end the conflict with 
Bangsamoro on the Mindanao Island. This initiative was brokered by Malaysia. On 
October 15, 2012, the Government of the Philippines and MILF signed the Framework of 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro at Malacanag Palace (“The 2012 Framework,” 2012). 
Nevertheless, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III (Sulu Sultan) claimed that this agreement had 
sidelined the Sultanate of Sulu’s interests, especially the ancestral claims on the Kingdom 
of Sulu covering the whole archipelago of Sulu, which includes Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-tawi, 
Zamboanga and Palawan; and the claim over Sabah. The Bangsamoro Peace Agreement 
between MILF and the Philippine government had diminished Sultan Sulu’s status to 
political non-entity (Fabella, 2013; Lapena, 2013). 
In this crisis, the only political ally that supported the Sultan Jamalul Kiram III 
was Nur Misouri, who is a former leader of MNLF. He was a former governor of ARMM 
during Arroyo’s administration, and threatened to send his fighters in support of intruders 
if Malaysia decided to resort to aggression. By contrast, other main MNLF leaders did 
not support the sultan’s intrusion in Sabah (Chooi, 2013a). 
On the whole, the political considerations of re-claiming the right of Sabah, to 
internationalize the issue and to be included in the Bangsamoro Peace Agreement 
weighed heavily on the sultan’s mind. 
2. Economic Analysis 
The Bangsamoro Peace Agreement had sidelined the sultan, and the Philippine 
government negotiated with MILF for a settlement of Mindanao. Mindanao is 
economically important; as government of Philippines has prioritized government’s 
infrastructure budget over other region (Standard Chartered Global Research, 2013). So, 
the sultan feared considerable prospective economical loss when he was taken out of the 
equation. At the same time, the sultan demanded an increase in rental payment for Sabah 
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 from Malaysia based on Sabah’s GDP. On the whole, these two economic factors heavily 
influenced the sultan during this crisis. 
3. Social Analysis 
There are many Suluk people (Tausug) living in Sabah, including the families of 
the Sultanate of Sulu, and around 800,000 Filipinos, who are basically labourer in the 
palm oil industry. Among the social fallout of this crisis could be their forced deportation, 
as many of them are poor and undocumented (Poling et al., 2013). On one hand, the 
sultan wanted to gain politically in the eyes of Tausugs; on the other hand, he could lose 
their support if they lost their livelihoods because of his intruders. Nonetheless, the 
immigrant population in Malaysia was not a particular concern for the Sultan.  
4. Legal Analysis 
The claim of Sabah had been transferred to the Philippines based on the 
agreement between Sultan Ismail Kiram I and the Philippine government in 1962 
(Filipina di balik, 2013); however, since President Marcos’s administration, the 
government of the Philippines had not pursued the matter. Sultan Jamalul Kiram has been 
persistent about his right to Sabah. During this crisis, the Philippine authorities warned 
the sultan of prosecution for violating the Philippine law with the invasion of Lahad Datu 
(Poling et al., 2013). The government of the Philippines had also sent a naval ship on a 
humanitarian mission to pick up the intruders if the intruders agreed to leave peacefully 
(Poling et al., 2013). Malaysia had urged the intruders to leave Sabah peacefully or face 
Malaysian law for invading Sabah with force. Although the sultan feared legal 
consequences both from Malaysia and the Philippines, his political, economic and social 
concerns eclipsed this factor. 
C. RESULT OF PESTEL ANALYSIS 
In the following sections the previously discussed factors are mapped to their 
potential events and corresponding effects. This information is considered in terms of 
their influence on the players’ judgment. 
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 1. Influences on the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
The identified events or issues were further analyzed for their effect on the crisis. 
Table 11 shows the possible events and their effects on the prime minister’s judgment 
during the crisis.  
 
 • Events/Issues • Affects 
• Political • Domestic pressure to 
take stern action against 
the intruders. 
• Domestic pressure due 
to allegations of staging 
the crisis to distract 
public attention from the 
scandals, especially RCI 
on mismanagement of 
identification cards issue 
in Sabah. 
• Domestic pressure due 
to falling popular 
support because of 
government’s poor 
performance. 
• Domestic pressure to 
dissolve the Parliament 
for the general election. 
• Detrimental support for 
government alliance 
party after general 
election.  
• Credibility as a 
respected Muslim state. 
• Malaysian role in 
Bangsamoro Framework 
Agreement. 
• No apparent regional or 
international 
disapproval. 
• Delay in taking stern action 
could make the government 
vulnerable to allegations of 
staging the crisis or failing to 
defend the state sovereignty. 
Subsequently, it could adversely 
affect the ruling coalition’s 
public support in general 
elections. Conversely, taking 
strong action could boost the 
government’s position in the 
upcoming elections. 
• If action of the Malaysian 
government was perceived as not 
based on spirit of Islamic 
brotherhood, it could jeopardize 
the Bangsamoro Framework 
Agreement (due to adverse 
reaction, especially from the 
Moro people). The failure of this 
framework could also affect 
Malaysian interests in Sabah.      
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  • Events/Issues • Affects 
• Economic • Local unrest could 
adversely affect local 
economy. 
• Financial and casualty 
costs of the crisis  
• The longer the crisis, the higher 
the financial burden on the 
government. Locals getting 
affected could adversely affect 
the government’s performance in 
the upcoming elections. 
• Social • Very low possibility of 
Sabah residents, 
including immigrants, 
supporting the intruders. 
• Possible local unrest due 
to security forces’ 
highhandedness.  
 
• High probability of Sabah 
residents’ supporting to 
Malaysian government. 
• Any unpopular preventive action 
by the security forces could 
affect ruling coalition’s vote 
bank in the elections. 
• Technological • Military and 
technological power was 
superior. 
• Asymmetric conflict.  
• Aiding affected local 
people 
• Reduce adverse impact 
to government in general 
election. 
• Cost involved in security 
forces and civil defense 
operations, financial and 
human casualties. 
• Failure to care for the welfare of 
the displaced population could 
affect ruling coalition’s vote 
bank in the elections. 
• Overreaction of Malaysian 
security forces could harm 
Malaysian reputation as a 
respected Muslim state. 
• Environmental • Compensation cost • Failure to compensate the loss 
could affect ruling coalition’s 
vote bank in the elections. 
• Legal • Malaysian penal code • Failure to take legal action on the 
intruders could be seen as 
weakness of the government in 
handling this attack on 
Malaysian sovereignty. 
• Allegation of staging the crisis. 
Table 11. Possible effects of events on the Malaysian Prime Minister. 
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 Based on the analysis of events and effects in Table 11, the Malaysian prime 
minister could have considered that an external threat such as MNLF, MILF and the 
Philippines had a very low probability of actively supporting the Sultan of Sulu’s men. 
Even local residents, including the Suluk and Filipinos, had a low probability of actively 
supporting the intruders. It was clear that the intruders with their smagll weapons were no 
match for the Malaysian forces. The Malaysian prime minister could have read that the 
international community had a high probability of not supporting this action by non-state 
actors aimed at destabilizing the region. Overall, his main concerns are short listed and 
clustered as in the following. 
1. Political survival in the elections. The thirteenth general elections were 
to be the first in which Dato’ Seri Najib was leading the Barisan National 
as leader of the coalition. The opposition parties had gained tremendous 
support from the Malaysian voters since the twelfth general election. 
Meanwhile, the Barisan National had been criticized on a number of 
issues; and the Merdeka poll showed that the government was disliked 
particularly by the young voters. The public demanded an explanation on 
how a handful of intruders could challenge Malaysian sovereignty, and 
why the government was too cautious in taking a strong action against 
them. This crisis had to be solved tactfully by the prime minister as any 
wrong move could politically cost him dearly. On the other hand, popular 
and bold handling could provide him the critical voter support he badly 
needed at this stage.  
2. Cost to Malaysia. The crisis had caused the government to spend on troop 
mobilization, humanitarian aid to the displaced population, setbacks in 
tourism and disturbance in local economy—especially the palm oil 
plantations, and refinery production and development programs. The 
longer the crisis dragged on, the higher the financial cost to the national 
exchequer would be. Besides monetary cost, friendly casualties or 
collateral damage could also politically cost the prime minister. Any 
escalation could affect local immigrants. Any resultant civil unrest could 
have adverse effects on local economy. Moreover, any further 
mobilization of resources to deal with civil unrest would also cost 
financially. 
3. Social unrest. Lahad Datu holds quite a large number of ethnic Suluk and 
Filipino immigrants. Preparation to prevent an escalation could cause a 
deterrence trap as the move could be misinterpreted as persecution of 
Filipinos. Furthermore, the social unrest could adversely affect the 
government’s popularity. 
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 4. Malaysian credibility. Malaysia had brokered the Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement as a contribution to regional stability. Malaysia is 
respected by other Muslim countries due to its tolerance and compassion 
on Muslim political issues around the world. It was important that this 
crisis did not jeopardize the Malaysian reputation which could adversely 
affect the support from the Muslim community in Mindanao for the peace 
arrangement. Failure of this framework could adversely affect Malaysian 
interests in Sabah. 
2. Influences on Sultan Sulu 
It is clear that Sultan Sulu’s main concern is the survival of the sultanate itself. 
Table 12 shows the possible events and their effect on Sultan Sulu’s judgment in 
resolving the crisis. 
 
 Events/Issues Affects 
Political • Sidelined in 
Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement. 
• Reviving the ancestral 
claim over Sabah. 
 
• Possibility of losing 
authority and right to 
ancestral kingdom of Sulu 
to MILF and Philippine 
government.  
• Increased dilemma for 
Malaysian PM’s decision 
making by getting 
favorable statements from 
Misuari.  
• Internationalizing the 
Sabah issue and reasserting 
Sultan of Sulu’s authority 
over Sabah. 
Economic • Sabah quit rent 
increment. 
• Losing the privilege as the 
sole recipient of Sabah quit 
rent. 
Social • Assistance from local 
Suluk in Sabah. 
• Increased cost to 
Malaysian government.  
Technology • Small arms for self-
defense. 
• Adverse effect on the 
safety of his men. 
Environmental • None • None 
Legal • Ancestral right to 
Sabah. 
• International recognition; 
and pressure on Malaysia 
to re-open negotiations on 
the issue. 
Table 12. Possible effects of events on Sultan Sulu. 
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 The main objective of the incursion was to have Malaysia and other international 
actors recognize Sultan Sulu’s ancestral right to the Kingdom of Sulu and North Borneo. 
Analysis of events and effects suggests that the possibility of the intruders achieving a 
military victory were very slim, but Sultan Sulu had his own concerns. The concerns 
were as follows. 
1. Inclusion in Bangsamoro Framework Agreement. Sultan was very 
concerned that the authority over the ancestral kingdom of Sulu and North 
Borneo was to be turned over to MILF. His royal family house would lose 
its political leverage and economic perks. Furthermore, the framework had 
sidelined the issue of Sabah which had been his passion. He hoped that the 
incursion would persuade the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement 
committee to consider his interests seriously; and he would also be a 
player in the Agreement. 
2. Safety of the intruders. He sent his brother, the crown prince, to lead the 
mission. He was trying to highlight the seriousness of his message. At the 
same time, having the crown prince among the intruders could make 
Malaysia hesitant to employ kinetic means against the intruders. Even 
though he repeatedly said that the intruders would not leave Sabah, he also 
kept up his efforts to discredit the Malaysian forces by accusations of their 
using disproportionate force against his men. He also believed that he 
could count on Misuari’s support. 
3. Revive the Sabah claim. The signing of the Bangsamoro Framework 
Agreement could mean that the Kiram royal house would lose authority 
over its ancestral kingdom of Sulu, and Sabah’s rental money. Malaysia 
did not want to negotiate over the dispute of Sabah and raise the Sabah 
quit rent. By pursuing this desperate move, he thought that the issue of 
Sabah could be revived to his advantage by attracting international 
attention. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter has identified the main concerns of the two players in the Lahad Datu 
crisis. The Prime Minister of Malaysia had four main concerns, while the Sultan of Sulu 
had three. These concerns are to be fed into AHP analysis to produce a qualitative 
representation of and relative degree of concern toward different issues in order to seek 
the solution to end the crisis.  
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 IV. AHP MODEL ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes the main concerns of the two players of this case study. 
These concerns were provided by the PESTEL analysis in Chapter III. The focus of this 
chapter is to produce global weights for alternatives in AHP analysis and hence payoffs 
for both players in Game Theory. The following sections cover in detail the four steps 
involving AHP analysis. 
A. STRUCTURING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The first step of this analysis is to formulate objectives for both players. The 
decision is assumed to be made by both players after Malaysian security forces besieged 
the intruders and before the date given for voluntary surrender expired. The objective of 
each player in this decision making situation was to choose the most preferable strategy 
to solve the crisis to his maximum benefit. Both players are assumed to have only two 
strategies each. As per conjecture, the Malaysian Prime Minister either had to persuade 
the intruders to leave Sabah peacefully (Negotiation), or to disarm the intruders by force 
and prosecute them in accordance with Malaysian law (Assault). Meanwhile, Sultan Sulu 
had a choice of either ordering the intruders to stay put and fight (Fight), or accepting the 
offer to leave Sabah peacefully (Leave). At the same time, each player also took into 
consideration the other party’s response in relation to their strategy as a game theory 
approach of a non-zero sum game. As a result of these interactions, each player had four 
probable outcomes generated from his chosen strategy which consequently become four 
alternatives (as their course of action) for each player to choose in AHP analysis. The 
four alternatives are labelled as Outcome 1 through Outcome 4. Outcome 1 means that 
the prime minister expected a certain outcome when he played the Negotiation strategy 
and expected Sultan Sulu to play the Leave strategy. Other alternatives’ descriptions 
follow in Table 13, showing the summary of strategy options and alternative courses of 




   Sultan Jamalul Kiram III 
(Strategies) 




Negotiation Outcome 1 Outcome 3 
Assault Outcome 2 Outcome 4 
Table 13. Strategy interactions and possible alternatives for 
Lahad Datu crisis. 
Strategy Description 
PM Negotiation Besiege the area and continue the negotiations to convince the 
intruders to leave Sabah peacefully. 
PM Assault Assault by security forces, and arrest the intruders. 
Sulu Leave Surrender unconditionally, and leave for Sulu peacefully. 
Sulu Fight Dig in and fight. 
Table 14. Description of strategies. 
The next step is to establish decision criteria for both players. The decision 
criteria of each player were generated based on the associated PESTEL analysis carried 
out in Chapter III.  
1. Decision Criteria of the Prime Minister 
The decision criteria for Prime Minister are as follows: 
1. Political survival in thirteenth general elections. Under this criterion, each 
alternative was evaluated in light of its potential political advantage or 
harm to the ruling coalition’s success in the coming elections. The 
alternatives were ordered according to their potential for accruing 
maximum political mileage for the prime minister in the upcoming 
elections.  
2. Cost to Malaysia. Under this criterion, each alternative was evaluated 
against four main considerations—duration of standoff, financial loss, 
adverse effects on local economy, and human casualties. Any alternative 
that was evaluated to present a relatively high probability of increased cost 
was considered as a relatively low preference and vice versa.  
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 3. Local population’s unrest. Under this criterion, each alternative was 
evaluated against its possible effect on the local population, including 
ethnic Suluk and Filipinos. These were both legal and illegal residents 
who were, in the case of a prolonged standoff, expected to go through 
additional hardships in their daily business, discrimination from the larger 
population of Malaysia; and were sitting on the fence wondering whether 
to support the government or intruders. Any alternative that was thought to 
present a relatively high probability of increasing unrest in the local 
population was rendered as a relatively low preference and vice versa.  
4. Malaysia’s credibility. Under this criterion, each alternative was evaluated 
against its possible effect on Malaysia’s credibility as a leading Muslim 
state advocating Muslims’ brotherhood. Moreover, taking action against 
fellow Muslims could also be detrimental to Mindanao Muslims’ support 
of the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement. Any alternative that was 
evaluated to present a relatively high probability to tarnish Malaysia’s 
image was rendered as a relatively low preference and vice versa. 
2. Decision Criteria of Sultan Sulu 
Decision criteria of Sultan Sulu are as follows: 
1. To be included in Bangsamoro peace process. Under this consideration 
each alternative was evaluated against its effect on the probability of the 
sultan being included in the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement. He faced 
the risk of being reduced to a political non-entity. Moreover, his 
legitimacy was also being questioned by other claimants to his title. So, he 
expected through this crisis to be included in the agreement. Any 
alternative that was considered to present a relatively high probability was 
rendered as a relatively high preference and vice versa. 
2. Safety of the intruders. Under this consideration, each alternative was 
evaluated against its effect on the safety of his men in Tanduo. Any 
alternative that was evaluated to present a relatively low probability for 
the safety of his men was rendered as a relatively low preference and vice 
versa. 
3. Revive the Sabah claim. Under this consideration, each alternative was 
evaluated against its effect on the probability to revive the Sabah claim 
and extract acknowledgement from the Malaysian and Philippine 
governments as the rightful owner of the ancestral Kingdom of Sulu and 
North Borneo, and recipient of ‘Sabah quit’ rent. Any alternative that was 
evaluated to present a relatively high probability of achieving this 
objective was rendered as a relatively high preference and vice versa.  
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 The next step was to structure the AHP decision-making process for both players. 
The hierarchy of the decision-making process for both belligerents is depicted in Figure 
11 and Figure 12, respectively. Both hierarchies had one objective, one level of decision 
criteria (the prime minister has four decision criteria while Sultan Sulu has three) and 
four alternatives. The objective is to seek the best course of action (for self-interest) to 
solve the Lahad Datu crisis. The decision criteria for both players are as formulated in the 
previous paragraph of this section. While the alternatives are derived from both players’ 
strategies discussed in the previous section of this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 11. Prime minister’s decision-making structure. 
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Figure 12. Sultan Sulu’s decision-making structure. 
B. COMPUTATION 
This section will include the steps for developing weight and local weight for 
each criterion and synthesis ranking by software. 
1. Computation of Malaysian Prime Minister’s Decision Making  
Having established the hierarchy of decision making, the process proceeded to 
allocate and compute the relative weight for each decision criterion to produce the best 
alternative and relative global weight. 
a. Weights for Decision Criteria 
Pairwise comparison was carried out as shown in Table 15, and the Consistency 
Ratio is shown in Table 16. The result in Table 17 provided the ranking of the criterion 
and its weight. Political survival had the highest importance to influence the decision-
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 making process of the prime minister with the weight of 559 x 10-3, followed by social 






























Political Survival 1     3     4     5     
Cost  1/3 1     2     3     
Social unrest  1/4  1/2 1     2     
Credibility  1/5  1/3  1/2 1     






Table 16. Consistency result. 
 




Social Unrest 0.13549172 
Credibility 0.094899938 
Table 17. Decision criteria weight. 
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 b. Weights for Alternatives under Political Survival Criterion 
Table 18 shows the probable alternative of employing a particular alternative. The 
probable alternative is generated through the understanding of PESTEL analysis provided 
in Chapter III. It provided guidelines to make the pairwise comparison in Table 19, and 
Consistency Ratio in Table 20. The result of local weight for each alternative under the 
political survival criterion is as shown in Table 21. Outcome 2 had the highest 
importance in influencing the decision-making process of the prime minister, followed by 
Outcome 4, Outcome 1 and Outcome 3. This means use of force against the intruders is 
perceived as having the most benefit to the government in terms of political survival of 
the government and its coalition partners in the upcoming thirteenth general elections. 
 
Political Survival Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The prime minister risked looking weak if he extended his deadlines 
multiple times, which was expected to dent his coalition’s vote bank in the 
coming elections. However, the Malaysian population expected the 
intruders to be brought to justice instead of being allowed to leave after 
having challenged the Malaysian sovereignty.  
Outcome 2 Use of force was expected to boost his coalition’s chances of winning the 
elections. Moreover, there was a public demand to act in accordance with 
the law.   
Outcome 3 The public could accuse government of staging the crisis; and even worse 
there could be own troops’ casualties. 
Outcome 4 Although the prime minister would be acting as per the wishes of the 
masses, any possible troops’ casualties which could cost him politically. 
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Table 20. Consistency result. 
 Eigenvector Alternatives 
(Political Survival) 
Outcome 1 0.13444 
Outcome 2 0.512505 
Outcome 3 0.092594 
Outcome 4 0.260461 




 c. Weights for Alternatives under Cost Criterion 
Table 22 shows the probable result of employing a particular alternative. The 
probable result was generated through the understanding of PESTEL analysis provided in 
Chapter III. It provided guidelines for the pairwise comparison in Table 23. The 
consistency result is shown in Table 24. The result of the local weight for each alternative 
under the cost criterion is depicted in Table 25. Outcome 1 had the highest importance in 
influencing the decision-making process of the prime minister, followed by Outcome 2, 
Outcome 3 and Outcome 4. This means letting the intruders return peacefully without 
arresting them would cost the government the least financially and in terms of casualties. 
 
Cost Probable Results 
Outcome 1 Least human and financial cost involved.  
Outcome 2 Less chances of Malaysian casualties, but financial loss due to 
military operation.  
Outcome 3 Increased financial cost due to prolonged siege; fair chances of 
Malaysian casualties if invaders attack. 
Outcome 4 Highest financial cost as well as friendly casualties. 





























1     2     4     5     
Outcome 
2 
 1/2 1     3     4     
Outcome 
3 
 1/4  1/3 1     2     
Outcome 
4 
 1/5  1/4  1/2 1     
Table 23. Pairwise matrix of alternatives under Cost criterion. 
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Outcome 1 0.512164 
Outcome 2 0.281046 
Outcome 3 0.12037 
Outcome 4 0.08642 
Table 25. Weight of alternatives under Cost criterion. 
d. Weights for Alternatives under Local Unrest Criterion 
Table 26 shows the probable alternative of employing a particular alternative 
under the Local Unrest criterion. The probable alternative was generated through the 
understanding of PESTEL analysis provided in Chapter III. It provided guidelines to 
make the pairwise comparison in Table 27. The consistency result of the pairwise 
comparison is shown in Table 28. The result of the local weight for each alternative under 
the Local Unrest criterion is shown in Table 29. Outcome 1 had the highest importance in 
influencing the decision-making process of the prime minister, followed by Outcome 2, 
Outcome 3 and Outcome 4. This implied that letting the intruders leave without taking 
legal action was to reduce the duration of the crisis, and thus reduce the magnitude of 
unrest in the local population.  
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 Local Unrest Probable Results 
Outcome 1 Reduced duration of unrest. The best. 
Outcome 2 Reduced duration of crisis, but could cause conflicting action between the 
two players, which could garner sympathy from the locals. 
Outcome 3 Increased duration of unrest as security forces do not take any action to 
end the crisis. 
Outcome 4 The highest increment of unrest for the locals. 






























1     2     3     4     
Outcome 
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 1/2 1     2     3     
Outcome 
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 1/3  1/2 1     2     
Outcome 
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 1/4  1/3  1/2 1     








Table 28. Consistency result. 
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 Eigenvector Alternatives 
(Local Unrest) 
Outcome 1 0.479866 
Outcome 2 0.262146 
Outcome 3 0.155397 
Outcome 4 0.102592 
Table 29. Weight of alternatives under Local Unrest criterion.  
e. Weights for Alternatives under Malaysian Credibility Criterion 
Table 30 shows the probable result of employing particular decisions under the 
Malaysian Credibility criterion. The probable alternative is generated through the 
understanding of PESTEL analysis provided in Chapter III. It provided guidelines to 
make the pairwise comparison in Table 31. Its consistency result is shown in Table 32. 
The result of the local weight for each alternative under the Malaysian Credibility 
criterion is shown in Table 33. Outcome 1 had the highest importance in influencing the 
decision-making process of the prime minister, followed by Outcome 3, Outcome 4 and 
Outcome 2. This means that letting the intruders leave without any action against them, 
was expected to be more beneficial to Malaysian credibility, and good will among the 
Muslim population of Mindanao. 
 
Credibility Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The best spirit of brotherhood shown by Malaysian government. Best 
for Malaysian credibility and good will.  
Outcome 2 Assaulting and arresting the surrendering intruders would not be seen 
favorably by Muslims in the southern Philippines or local residents. 
Outcome 3 Looks good to Mindanao Muslims as Malaysians refrain from 
aggression. 
Outcome 4 Seen very unfavorable from Muslim brotherhood perspective. 
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Outcome 1 0.512505 
Outcome 2 0.092594 
Outcome 3 0.260461 
Outcome 4 0.13444 
Table 33. Weight for alternatives under Malaysian Credibility 
criterion. 
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 f. Global Weight or Payoff for Each Alternative 
The decision criteria weights and local alternative weights were computed in the 
global weight matrix, which is shown in Table 34. The result in Table 35 shows that 
Outcome 2 would be the most preferred by the prime minister. The other alternatives in 
order of preference were Outcome 1, Outcome 4 and Outcome 3, respectively. The best 
course of action for the prime minister was to assault and arrest the intruders without any 
resistance from the intruders, who believed they could leave Malaysia peacefully without 
being brought to justice. 
 
    4 x 4 Matrix  
  
4 x 1 
Matrix Political Cost Local Unrest Credibility 
Political 0.559546 0.13444 0.512164 0.479865505 0.5125053 
Cost 0.210062 0.512505 0.281046 0.262145561 0.0925937 
Local Unrest 0.135492 0.092594 0.12037 0.155396998 0.2604615 
Credibility 0.0949 0.260461 0.08642 0.102591936 0.1344395 
Table 34. Global weight matrix. 
Alternatives Values 
Outcome 1 0.29646594 (296.46594 x 10-3) 
Outcome 2 0.39011316 (390.11316 x 10-3) 
Outcome 3 0.1228685 (122.88685 x 10-3) 
Outcome 4 0.1905524 (190.5524 x 10-3) 
Table 35. Global weight of alternatives for prime minister. 
2. Computation of Sultan Sulu’s Decision Making 
Having established the hierarchy of decision making, the process proceeded to 
allocate and compute the relative weight for each decision criterion to produce the best 
alternative and relative global weight. 
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 a. Weights for Decision Criteria 
Pairwise comparison was carried out as depicted in Table 36. The result in Table 
37 provides the ranking of the criteria; Table 38 provides the consistency result, and 
Table 39 shows their weight. The Sabah claim had the highest importance in influencing 
the decision-making process of the Sultan Sulu, with the weight of 588 x 10–3, followed 
by inclusion in the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement (309 x 10–3), and Safety of his 
men (103x 10–3).  
 
Decision Criteria Considerations 
Bangsamoro Framework Agreement Sultan Sulu needed to be accepted as 
member of the Framework to protect his 
family’s ancestral right over Kingdom of 
Sulu. 
Safety of the Sultan’s Men The intruders were armed with light 
firearms in limited numbers. 
Revival of Sabah Claim The idea was to get Malaysia to the 
negotiating table over the Sabah issue, and 
increase the Sabah quit rent. Moreover, to 
draw international attention to force 
Malaysia to come to the negotiating table. 


































1     4      1/2 
Safety of Men  1/4 1      1/5 
Sabah Claim 2     5     1     
 
Table 37. Pairwise matrix of decision criteria. 
 59 





Table 38. Consistency result. 
 
 
Eigenvector Criterion Weights 
Bangsamoro Framework Agreement 0.309245961 
Safety of Men 0.103231598 
Sabah Claim 0.587522442 
Table 39. Weight of decision criteria. 
b. Weights for Alternatives under Bangsamoro Framework Agreement 
Table 40 shows the probable result of choosing a particular decision under the 
Bangsamoro Framework Agreement criterion. The probable alternative was generated 
through the understanding of PESTEL analysis provided in Chapter III. It provided 
guidelines to make the pairwise comparison shown in Table 41. The pairwise consistency 
is shown in Table 42. The result of the local weight for each alternative is depicted in 
Table 43. Outcome 4 has the highest value in influencing the decision-making process of 
Sultan Sulu, followed by Outcome 3, Outcome 2 and Outcome 1, respectively. This 
means that letting Malaysia assault, and the intruders retaliate in self defense, would be 
most beneficial in order to be considered as a member of the Bangsamoro Framework 
Agreement, and hence protecting the sultan’s ancestral right to the Kingdom of Sulu. 
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 Bangsamoro Framework Agreement Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The strategy to leave Sabah peacefully would 
not produce the required results. It would just 
expose sultan’s weak position. 
Outcome 2 Getting the men to lay down arms without 
resistance would not produce the required 
results, but it would degrade Malaysia’s 
goodwill and reputation among Mindanao 
Muslims and their support for the peace effort.  
Outcome 3 Might prove that they have the means to 
influence the decision.  
Outcome 4 Might prove that they have the means to 
influence the decision and damage Malaysia’s 
credibility as a broker of the Framework. 
Table 40. The probable results of alternatives under 




























1      1/2  1/4  1/5 
Outcome 
2 
2     1      1/2  1/4 
Outcome 
3 
4     2     1      1/2 
Outcome 
4 
5     4     2     1     
Table 41. Pairwise matrix on alternatives under Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement criterion. 
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Outcome 1 0.086514 
Outcome 2 0.133588 
Outcome 3 0.267176 
Outcome 4 0.512723 
Table 43. Weight of alternatives under Bangsamoro 
Framework Agreement criterion. 
c. Weights for Alternatives under Safety of the Sultan’s Men Criterion 
Table 44 shows the probable alternative of employing a particular decision under 
the Safety of Sultan’s men (intruders) criterion. The probable alternative was generated 
through the understanding of PESTEL analysis provided in Chapter III. It provided 
guidelines for the pairwise comparison shown in Table 45. The pairwise consistency is 
shown in Table 46, and the result of the local weight for each alternative is shown in 
Table 47. Outcome 1 has the highest value in influencing the decision-making process of 
Sultan Sulu, followed by Outcome 3, Outcome 2 and Outcome 4, in order of preference. 
This means that the best alternative for the safety of the sultan’s men was to take the 
Malaysian offer and leave Sabah peacefully. 
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 Safety Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The intruders leave Sabah safely. 
Outcome 2 The intruders are safe from any aggression but would face the Malaysian law. 
Outcome 3 The intruders would be safe but in a hostile environment. 
Outcome 4 The intruders would have a high probability of casualties. 
Table 44. The probable result of alternatives under Safety of 

























Outcome 1 1     3     2     4     
Outcome 2  1/3 1      1/2 2     
Outcome 3  1/2 2     1     3     
Outcome 4  1/4  1/2  1/3 1     
Table 45. Pairwise matrix of alternatives under Safety of the 






Table 46. Consistency result. 
Eigenvector Alternatives 
(Safety of Sultan’s Men) 
Outcome 1 0.479866 
Outcome 2 0.155397 
Outcome 3 0.262146 
Outcome 4 0.102592 
Table 47. Weights for alternatives under Safety of the 
Sultan’s Men criterion. 
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 d. Weights for Alternatives under Sabah Claim Criterion 
Table 48 shows the probable results of choosing a particular strategy under the 
Sabah Claim criterion. The probable alternative is generated through the understanding of 
PESTEL analysis provided in Chapter III. It provided guidelines for pairwise comparison 
as shown in Table 49. The comparison consistency is shown in Table 50, and the result of 
the local weight for each alternative is shown in Table 51. Outcome 4 had the highest 
potential to influence the decision-making process of the sultan, followed by Outcome 3, 
Outcome 2 and Outcome 1. This means that the best alternative was to put up a fight as 
determined in Outcome 4. 
 
Sabah Claim Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The strategy to leave Sabah would not produce the required results. It only 
showed that the sultan’s position was weak. 
Outcome 2 Being captured without resistance would not produce the required results, but it 
could fuel the anger of the Sulu people. 
Outcome 3 Might prove that they have the means and will to use aggression if necessary. 
Outcome 4 Might prove that they have the determination to defend their rights on Sabah 
through aggression, and increase the cost to the Malaysian government if 
Malaysia still refused to negotiate on the issue of the Sabah claim. 


























Outcome 1 1      1/2  1/4  1/5 
Outcome 2 2     1      1/2  1/4 
Outcome 3 4     2     1      1/2 
Outcome 4 5     4     2     1     
Table 49. Pairwise matrix of alternatives under Sabah Claim 
criterion. 
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Table 50. Consistency result. 
 
Eigenvector Alternatives  
(Sabah Claim) 
Outcome 1 0.086514 
Outcome 2 0.133588 
Outcome 3 0.267176 
Outcome 4 0.512723 
Table 51. Weight for alternatives under Sabah Claim 
criterion. 
e. Global Weight for Each Alternative 
The decision criteria weights and local alternative weight were computed in the 
global weight matrix shown in Table 52. The result in Table 53 shows that Outcome 4 
would be most preferred by the sultan. The next alternative in order of preference was 
Outcome 3, Outcome 2 and Outcome 1. The best alternative for the sultan was to engage 
in violence. 
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 Decision Criteria 4 x 1 







Bangsamoro Framework Agreement 0.309246 0.086514 0.479866 0.086514 
Safety of Men 0.103232 0.133588 0.155397 0.133588 
Sabah Claim 0.587522 0.267176 0.262146 0.267176 
 0 0.512723 0.102592 0.512723 
Table 52. Global weight matrix. 
Alternatives Values 
Outcome 1 0.1271203 (127.1203 x 10-3) 
Outcome 2 0.13583919 (135.83919 x 10-3) 
Outcome 3 0.26665632 (266.65632 x 10-3) 
Outcome 4 0.4703842 (470.3842 x 10-3) 
Table 53. Global weights for alternatives of Sultan Sulu. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In sensitivity analysis 1, MNLF was introduced into the equation of PESTEL 
analysis. The assumption is that Misuari has convinced MNLF fighters to support the 
sultan’s men. The context of concerns for both players could have changed; however, for 
this example, the present decision criteria were maintained but in a different context. If 
MNLF’s threat was credible, the relative preferences were developed to see any 
differences in global weights. Results in Table 54 through Table 57 suggest that there 
was a slight increase in cost value and credibility value. Even the Malaysian credibility 
criterion had jumped to third position. The prime minister has the same preference as the 
case study on all alternatives according to decision criterion preference. Nevertheless, the 
global weight of the alternative maintained the same ranking as in the case study result. 
So, it could be expected to have a similar alternative in game theory as Sultan Sulu’s 
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Political Survival 1     2     4     3     
Cost  1/2 1     3     2     
Social Unrest  1/4  1/3 1      1/2 
Credibility  1/3  1/2 2     1     






Table 55. Consistency result. 
Eigenvector Criterion Weights  
Political Survival 0.479865505 
Cost 0.262145561 
Social Unrest 0.102591936 
Credibility 0.155396998 
Table 56. Decision criteria weight. 
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 Alternatives Values 
Outcome 1 0.32764656 
Outcome 2 0.36089132 
Outcome 3 0.13240449 
Outcome 4 0.17905763 
Table 57. Global weight. 
In sensitivity analysis 2, a different set of inputs is introduced to the game’s 
PESTEL analysis: MNLF threat was credible, the thirteenth general elections were not in 
the near future, and international institutions such as the United Nations and the U.S. 
backed Sultan Sulu. Only the Prime Minister of Malaysia was affected by these inputs. 
So, only the prime minister’s response will be analyzed in this exercise. Sultan Sulu 
maintains the same response as in the case study. The result of the prime minister’s 
decision criteria is shown in Table 58 through Table 60. The Cost and Malaysian 
Credibility criteria occupied the top two places, and Political Survival ended up in the last 




























Political Survival 1      1/5  1/3  1/4 
Cost 5     1     3     2     
Social Unrest 3      1/3 1      1/2 
Credibility 4      1/2 2     1     
Table 58. Pairwise matrix for sensitivity analysis 2. 
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Social Unrest 0.160178301 
Credibility 0.267647816 
Table 60. Decision criteria matrix for sensitivity analysis 2. 
Subsequently, Table 61 through Table 64 display the results for the alternative 
preference in relation to the Political Survival criterion. This result was followed by 
Table 65 through Table 68 for Cost criterion, Table 69 through Table 72 for the Local 
Unrest criterion, Table 73 through Table 76 for the Credibility criterion and Table 77 for 
the Global Weight for Alternative in sensitivity analysis 2. It was observed that the prime 
minister responded differently to the introduced inputs. The result in Table 77 shows that 
Outcome 1 is his top preference, followed by Outcome 3, Outcome 2, and Outcome 4, 
accordingly. This exercise demonstrates that AHP analysis of this model with the same 
decision criteria could accommodate and respond accordingly to a different possibility 




 Political Survival Probable Results 
Outcome 1 International politics have precedence over domestic politics. Regional and 
international pressures effects are the least to Malaysia.   
Outcome 2 This action will satisfy domestic politics. But there could be some 
retaliation from MNLF and pressure from other international 
organizations. It also could impact Malaysia’s economy, such as boycotts 
at the international level. 
Outcome 3 Stalemate for both belligerents.  
Outcome 4 Regional and international political pressure will be the greatest. 



























Outcome 1 1     3     2     6     
Outcome 2  1/3 1      1/2 4     
Outcome 3  1/2 2     1     4     
Outcome 4  1/6  1/4  1/4 1     













Outcome 1 0.498567 
Outcome 2 0.163733 
Outcome 3 0.26709 
Outcome 4 0.07061 
 
Table 64. Local weight alternative under Political Survival in 
sensitivity analysis 2. 
Cost Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The least human and financial cost.   
Outcome 2 Retaliation from regional and international forces increase cost for 
Malaysia (e.g., boycott or military actions). 
Outcome 3 Increased cost due to prolonged siege. 
Outcome 4 The highest cost affected Malaysia as regional and international forces 
support Sultan Sulu’s fight. 





























1 3 2 5 
Outcome 
2 
1/3 1 1/3 4 
Outcome 
3 
1/2 3 1 2 
Outcome 
4 
1/5 1/4 1/2 1 
Table 66. Pairwise matrix of alternatives under Cost criterion. 
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Outcome 1 0.480531 
Outcome 2 0.155425 
Outcome 3 0.268439 
Outcome 4 0.095606 
 
Table 68. Local weight alternative under Cost in sensitivity 
analysis 2. 
Local Unrest Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The best action as it reduced the duration of the unrest situation 
among the locals.   
Outcome 2 Could trigger wider area of unrest if other regional and international 
forces interfere in the crisis. 
Outcome 3 Prolong unrest. 
Outcome 4 The worst action as a wider area could be affected as regional and 
international forces become involved in the crisis directly. 
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Outcome 1 0.479866 
Outcome 2 0.262146 
Outcome 3 0.155397 
Outcome 4 0.102592 
 
Table 72. Local weight alternative under Local Unrest in 




 Credibility Probable Results 
Outcome 1 The best result especially for the long term regional stability.   
Outcome 2 It will adversely affect the long term regional stability effort. 
Outcome 3 Stalemate for both belligerents. Mild effect on the long term 
regional stability effort. 
Outcome 4 The worst effect on the long term regional stability effort. 
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Outcome 1 0.519923 
Outcome 2 0.101509 
Outcome 3 0.28643 
Outcome 4 0.092138 
Table 76. Local weight alternative under Credibility in 
sensitivity analysis 2. 
Alternatives Values 
Outcome 1 0.49242524 
Outcome 2 0.15876015 
Outcome 3 0.2550381 
Outcome 4 0.09377651 
Table 77. Global weights for alternatives of sensitivity  
analysis 2. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated the viability of PESTEL analysis’s results to fit in 
AHP analysis. AHP analysis successfully translates both players’ concerns and degrees of 
concern in a quantitative representation. It also produced the global weights of the 
alternatives as a quantitative representation of each player’s preferred solution to the 
crisis. The highest value of global weight is translated as the best relative preference. This 
analysis suggests that the prime minister’s most preferred solution in solving the crisis is 
Outcome 2, followed by Outcome 1, Outcome 4, and Outcome 3. Meanwhile Sultan 
Sulu’s most preferred solution is Outcome 4 followed by Outcome 3, Outcome 2, and 
Outcome 1.  
By carrying out sensitivity analysis, we show that AHP analysis is responsive to 
different inputs according to the degree of the players’ responses toward these inputs. It 
shows the proposed AHP analysis is flexible to accommodate different inputs. 
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 Subsequently, both players’ global weights will be used as payoff for the game theory 
analysis, another phase of analysis which focuses on interaction between players.   
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 V. GAME THEORY MODEL ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the findings using game theory model 
analysis. The payoffs from Chapter IV are analyzed through the game theory model to 
determine the best strategy to be adopted by both rational players. The result of this 
analysis will be discussed to answer the research question. Two sets of game will be 
analysed in this chapter, which is the case study itself and the sensitivity analysis. 
A. CASE STUDY GAME 
The interaction between the prime minister and Sultan Sulu is depicted in Figure 
13. Both players have two strategies to choose from. Each player will calculate the 
probable response from the other player. The expected outcome is depicted by outcome 
payoffs. These payoffs are generated from the global weights of AHP analyses carried 
out in Chapter IV. The payoffs values are presented as nearest value of 10-3. The value on 
the left of each outcome box represents payoff for the prime minister, while the value on 
the right represents payoff for Sultan Sulu with exponent units are omitted for the ease of 
calculation. For example, the payoffs in the outcome box of 296,127 mean the value 296 
is the prime minister’s payoff for selecting the Negotiate strategy (after the value of 
Outcome 1 in global weight of alternatives for prime minister), while 127 is Sultan Sulu’s 
payoff when choosing the Leave strategy (after the value of Outcome 1 in global weight 
of alternatives for Sultan Sulu).   
 
 Sultan Sulu 
Leave  Fight 
Prime 
Minister 
Negotiate 296, 127  123, 267 
    
Assault 390, 136  191, 470 
Figure 13. Both players’ payoffs.  
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 1. Partial Sum Strategic Move Without Communication 
This analysis starts off by looking into the prime minister’s response to Sultan 
Sulu, without there being any communication between them. The prime minister, 
represented in Figure 14 by blue arrows, employs the same strategy (i.e., Assault), 
regardless of Sultan Sulu’s strategies. This means the prime minister has a dominant 
Assault strategy. The prime minister is prepared to disarm the intruders by force and 
charge them in accordance with Malaysian law even if they surrender to the security 
forces. 
 
 Sultan Sulu 
Leave  Fight 
Prime Minister 





Assault 390, 136  191, 470 
Figure 14. Prime minister’s response. 
Likewise, as shown in Figure 15 with red arrows, Sultan Sulu responds with the 
same strategy (i.e., Fight) regardless of the prime minister’s strategies. This means Sultan 
Sulu also has a dominant (Fight) strategy. Sultan Sulu determines to order his men to stay 
put at Tanduo, and be ready to fight until the end.  
 
 Sultan Sulu 
Leave  Fight 
Prime Minister 
Negotiate 296, 127 
 
123, 267 
    
Assault 390, 136 
 
191, 470 
Figure 15. Sultan Sulu’s response. 
 78 
  
The interaction of both players’ preferences is shown in Figure 16 using arrows 
for both colors. The flow of the arrows indicates the players’ responses and the box with 
only incoming arrows indicates a Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium means that both 
players could not unilaterally improve their position with their own strategies. The Nash 
Equilibrium for this interaction is the outcome with the payoff of 191, 470, where the 
Prime Minster plays Assault and Sultan Sulu plays Fight. So, the probable outcome of 
both players’ interactions, without any communication between them, is to resolve the 
crisis through armed conflict (Assault-Fight).  
 
 Sultan Sulu 









Assault 390, 136 
 
191, 470 
Figure 16. Interaction of prime minister and Sultan Sulu strategies. 
2. Partial Sum Strategy—Make the First Move 
This section analyzes the possible outcomes when a player moves first and makes 
his move known to the other player, or communicates before making the move. This 
strategic move consists of first move, threat, promise, and a combination of threat and 
promise. For this strategic move, both players are assumed to play conservatively their 
maximum strategy. In the Nash Equilibrium, Sultan Sulu has the maximum payoff 
option, while the Prime Minister of Malaysia has the third best payoff option. So in this 
section, the focus will be on the prime minister’s strategic moves to maximize his payoff 
and make it superior to the Nash Equilibrium payoff. 
The prime minister’s strategic moves start off with his first move strategy. 
According to the prime minister’s calculation—whether his preferred strategy is 
Negotiation or Assault—Sultan Sulu should always choose the Fight strategy to 
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 maximize his payoff. The steps and payoff of relevant outcomes are depicted in Table 78. 
So the prime minister is likely to make the first move using the Assault strategy, and 
Sultan Sulu responds with the Fight strategy; or the prime minister can make the Sultan 
make the first move. It was found that regardless of the strategy chosen by Sultan Sulu, 
the prime minister will always choose the Assault strategy. The steps and relevant payoffs 
are depicted in Table 79. So, the likely outcome is that Sultan Sulu makes the first move 
with Fight strategy and the Prime Minister of Malaysia responds with the Assault 
strategy. The result of the first move strategy shows that regardless of who moves first, 
the outcome remains the same, and consistent with Nash Equilibrium payoff. 
 
Steps First Move: Prime Minister Outcome 
Payoffs 
1 If Negotiate, then Sultan Sulu Fight 123, 267 
2 If Assault, then Sultan Sulu Fight 191, 470 
3 Likely outcome: Prime Minister Assault, then Sultan Sulu Fight 191, 470 
Table 78. Prime minister makes the first move. 
Steps First Move: Sultan Sulu Outcome 
Payoffs 
1 If Leave, then Prime Minister Assault 390, 136 
2 If Fight, then Prime Minister Assault 191, 470 
3 Likely outcome 191,470 
Table 79. Prime minister forces Sultan Sulu to make the first 
move. 
The outcome in the first move strategy for the prime minister does not improve 
his payoff. So, the next strategy to improve the prime minister’s payoff is to explore a 
threat strategy. In this case, the threat is to be communicated to Sultan Sulu. The prime 
minister wants to persuade Sultan Sulu to choose the Leave strategy instead of the Fight 
strategy. If Sultan Sulu does not cooperate and still insists on using the Fight strategy, the 
prime minister would choose the Negotiation strategy instead of the Assault strategy, 
where both players will suffer as a consequence. It turns out the threat is credible, and 
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 this outcome ceases to be an option. The steps and relevant payoffs are depicted in steps 
1 to 3 of Table 80. Nevertheless, Sultan Sulu will re-evaluate his options. If he plays the 
Leave strategy, the prime minister will play the Assault strategy, and if he chooses the 
Fight strategy, he only leaves the prime minister to choose the Negotiation strategy. As 
shown in steps 4 to 6 of Table 80, the payoff from the Fight strategy is better than that of 
the Leave strategy for Sultan Sulu. He will definitely choose the Fight strategy to 
maximize his payoff. So, even though the prime minister’s threat is credible, it does not 
work to persuade Sultan Sulu to cooperate. 
 
Steps Prime Minister’s Threat Strategy: Prime Minister wants Sultan Sulu to Leave, 
and thus threatens with Fight. Both will lose in payoff. 
Payoffs 
1 If Sultan Sulu plays Fight, the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 123, 267 
2 Normally, if Sultan Sulu plays Fight, the Prime Minister should Assault. 191, 470 
3 Both players lose and threat could work.  191, 470 is 
then deleted. 
4 But if Sultan Sulu plays Leave, the Prime Minister will play Assault. 390, 136 
5 If Sultan Sulu plays Fight, only one payoff is available. 123, 267 
6 So, Sultan Sulu will play Fight instead of Leave to maximize his payoff. Therefore, the Prime 
Minister’s threat does not work. 
Table 80. Prime minister’s threat strategy. 
Clearly, the threat strategy does not work to improve the prime minister’s payoff, 
and he could explore a promise strategy. He could offer Sultan Sulu a promise that if he 
chooses the Leave strategy, the prime minister would choose the Negotiation strategy, 
thereby hurting himself. As shown in Table 81, Sultan Sulu also suffers. As Sultan Sulu 
is not improving his payoff, so this is not a valid promise. So, the prime minister’s 
promise does not work to persuade Sultan Sulu to cooperate. 
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 Steps Prime Minister’s promise strategy:  Prime Minister wants Sulu to Leave, 
promises to allow Sultan to exercise Leave (where Prime Minister will lose 
and Sultan Sulu gains). 
Payoffs 
1 If Sultan Sulu plays Leave, Prime Minister promises Negotiate. 296, 127  
2 Rationally, if Sultan Sulu plays Leave, Prime Minister will Assault. 390, 136 
3 Prime Minister loses and so does Sultan Sulu. Therefore, the promise strategy also does not 
work. 
Table 81. The prime minister’s promise strategy. 
All strategy moves explored above do not improve the prime minister’s payoff. 
The only available choice is either to go for a Nash Equilibrium solution or first move 
strategy. So, the most likely outcome in strategic moves is for the prime minister to 
employ an Assault strategy and Sultan Sulu to employ a Fight strategy. So, both players 
resort to the use of force. 
3. Security Level and Arbitration 
Strategic moves have failed to improve the prime minister’s payoff. Now, let us 
analyze the possibility of arbitration. Figure 17 shows the security level game for prime 
minister. The blue arrows represent the prime minister’s efforts to maximize his payoff, 
while the red arrows are Sultan Sulu’s efforts to minimize the prime minister’s payoff. 
The box contains 191 does not have any arrow coming out from it. So the security level 
for the prime minister is 191, as departure payoff in arbitration. 
 
 Sultan Sulu 












Figure 17. Prime minister’s security level. 
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 Figure 18 shows the security level game for Sultan Sulu. The red arrows represent 
Sultan Sulu’s efforts to maximize his payoff while the blue arrows are the prime 
minister’s efforts to minimize Sultan Sulu’s payoff. The box contains 267 does not have 
any arrow coming out from it. So the security level for the prime minister is 267, as 
departure payoff in arbitration.  
 
 Sultan Sulu 












Figure 18. Sultan Sulu’s security level. 
Figure 19 shows the security level of both players on a graph. Dotted red line is 
Sultan Sulu security level, while the dotted blue line is for the prime minister. It clearly 
shows that the intersection of both players’ security levels produce a status quo (SQ) at 
coordinate 191, 267. SQ will be the departure point to find the Nash solution point or 
Nash point by moving Northeast toward the line linking the Outcome 4 and Outcome 2. 
Nash point is the fairest point for both players for arbitration (Straffin, 1993, pp. 105–
109). Nash point is a coordinate on the line half the distance between Outcome 4 and 
Point A, where Point A is the intersection of Sultan Sulu security levels line and line 
between Outcome 4 and Outcome 2. The y axis value for the Nash Point is the point lies 
on the half distance between SQ and Outcome 4 while for x axis, the point lies between 
the half distance between SQ and Point A. The result is Nash point lies on coordinate 
251.5, 368.5, which is closer to Outcome 4 than Outcome 2. So, it is clear that the only 
solution to resolve the conflict in Lahad Datu crisis is the use of force by Malaysian 




Figure 19. Graph of security level for prime minister and Sultan Sulu. 
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS GAME 
Only sensitivity analysis 2 will be shown in this section. The interaction between 
the prime minister and Sultan Sulu is depicted in Figure 20. Both players have two 
strategies to choose from. Each player will calculate the probable response from the other 
player. The expected outcome is depicted by outcome payoffs. These payoffs are 
generated from the AHP sensitivity analysis 2 carried out in Chapter IV. 
 
 Sultan Sulu 
Leave  Fight 
Prime Minister 
Negotiate 492,127  255, 267 
    
Assault 159, 136  94, 470 
Figure 20. Both players payoffs 
1. Partial Sum Strategic Moves Without Communication 
This analysis begins by looking into the prime minister’s response to Sultan Sulu, 
without there being any communication between them. The prime minister, represented 
in Figure 21 by the blue arrows, employs the same strategy, Negotiate, regardless of 
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Sultan Sulu’s strategies. This means the prime minister has a dominant Negotiate 
strategy.   
As shown in Figure 21 by the red arrows, Sultan Sulu responds with the same 
strategy (i.e., Fight) regardless of prime minister’s strategies. This means Sultan Sulu 
also has a dominant (Fight) strategy. Sultan Sulu determines to order his men to stay put 
at Tanduo, and be ready to fight to the end until their demands are met. 
Meanwhile, the interaction of both players’ preferences is shown in Figure 21 
using arrows of both colors. The flow of the arrows indicates the players’ responses and 
the box with only incoming arrows indicates a Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium 
means that neither player could unilaterally improve his position with his own strategy. 
The Nash Equilibrium for this interaction is the outcome with a payoff of 255, 267, 
where the Prime Minister plays Negotiate and Sultan Sulu plays Fight. The probable 
outcome of both players’ interaction, without any communication between them, is the 
prime minister willing to Negotiate but Sultan Sulu insisting on Fighting. 
 
 
 Sultan Sulu 









Assault 159, 136 
 
94, 470 
Figure 21. Interaction of prime minister and Sultan Sulu strategies. 
2. Partial Sum Strategy—Make the First Move  
In the Nash Equilibrium, both players do not have the best payoff option. In this 
section, the focus will be on the prime minister’s strategic moves to maximize his payoff 
and make it superior to the Nash Equilibrium payoff. 
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 The prime minister’s strategic moves begin with the first move strategy. By the 
prime minister’s calculation—regardless of whether his preferred strategy is Negotiation 
or Assault—Sultan Sulu would always choose the Fight strategy to maximize his payoff. 
The steps and payoff of relevant outcomes are depicted in Table 82. The prime minister is 
likely to make the first move using the Negotiate strategy, and Sultan Sulu responds with 
a Fight strategy; or the prime minister can force the Sultan to make the first move. It was 
found that regardless of the strategy chosen by Sultan Sulu, the prime minister will 
always choose the Negotiation strategy. The steps and relevant payoffs are depicted in 
Table 83 So, the likely outcome is that Sultan Sulu makes the first move using the Fight 
strategy and the prime minister responds using the Negotiation strategy. The result in the 
first move strategy shows that player who moves first achieves the same payoff as the 
Nash Equilibrium payoff. So, without any communication, prime minister is better off 
with the Negotiation strategy. 
 
Steps First Move: Prime Minister Outcome 
Payoffs 
1 If Negotiate, then Sultan Sulu uses Fight. 255, 267 
2 If Assault, then Sultan Sulu uses Fight. 94, 470 
3 Likely outcome: The Prime Minister uses Negotiate, then Sultan Sulu uses 
Fight. 
255, 267 
Table 82. Prime minister’s first move. 
 
Steps First Move: Sultan Sulu Outcome 
Payoffs 
1 If Leave, then the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 492, 127 
2 If Fight, then the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 255, 267 
3 Likely outcome. 255, 267 
Table 83. Prime minister forces Sultan Sulu to move first. 
The outcome in the first move strategy for the prime minister does not improve 
his payoff. The next strategy to improve the prime minister’s payoff is to explore a threat 
strategy (Table 83). In this case, the threat is to be communicated to Sultan Sulu. The 
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 prime minister wants to persuade Sultan Sulu to choose the Leave strategy instead of the 
Fight strategy. If Sultan Sulu does not cooperate and still insists on the Fight strategy, the 
prime minister would choose the Assault strategy instead of the Negotiation strategy 
where the prime minister loses, but Sultan Sulu gains. Therefore, there is no threat.   
 
Steps Prime Minister’s Threat Strategy: Prime Minister wants Sultan Sulu to Leave, 
and thus threatens to Fight. Both will lose in payoff. 
Payoffs 
1 If Sultan Sulu uses Fight, the Prime Minister uses Assault. 94, 470 
2 Normally, if Sultan Sulu chooses Fight, the Prime Minister should use 
Negotiate. 
255, 267 
3 The Prime Minister loses, but Sultan Sulu gains; so, there is no threat.  
Table 84. Prime minister’s threat strategy. 
The threat strategy does not work to improve the prime minister’s payoff, and he 
could explore a promise strategy. He could offer Sultan Sulu a promise that if he chooses 
a Leave strategy, the prime minister would also use an Assault  strategy, thereby hurting 
himself. Sultan Sulu would gain. Therefore, payoff 169, 136 can be deleted. Sultan Sulu 
calculates that whatever move he makes the prime minister resorts to Negotiate. Sultan 
Sulu plays Fight to maximize his utility. So, the promise does not work for the prime 
minister. The promise strategy’s moves are depicted in Table 85. 
 
Steps Prime Minister’s promise strategy:  Prime Minister wants Sulu to choose 
Leave, promises to allow Sultan to exercise Leave (where Prime Minister 
will lose and Sultan Sulu gains). 
Payoffs 
1 If Sultan Sulu chooses Leave, the Prime Minister uses Assault. 159,  136  
2 Normally, if Sultan Sulu uses Leave, the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 492, 127 
3 The Prime Minister loses; Sultan Sulu gains. Therefore, there could be a 
promise. 
159, 136 is 
deleted 
4 For Sultan Sulu, if his move is Leave, the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 492, 127 
5 If Sultan Sulu chooses Fight, the Prime Minister uses Negotiate. 255, 267 
3 Sultan Sulu will select Fight; so, the promise does not work. 
Table 85. Prime minister’s promise strategy. 
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 All previously explored, strategic moves  do not improve the prime minister’s 
payoff. The only available choice is either to go for a Nash Equilibrium solution or first 
move strategy. The most likely outcome in strategic moves is for the Prime Minister to 
employ the Negotiation strategy and Sultan Sulu to employ the Fight strategy. 
3. Security Level and Arbitration 
Next, we will analyze the possibility of arbitration. The security level for each 
player is to be determined before proceeding with the arbitration process. The game will 
proceed by playing each player’s payoffs separately. The player whose payoffs are being 
analyzed will maximize his payoff, while the opponent minimizes the other player’s 
outcome. 
Figure 22 shows the security level game for the prime minister. The blue arrows 
represent the prime minister’s efforts to maximize his payoff, while the red arrows are 
Sultan Sulu’s efforts to minimize the prime minister’s payoff. The result shows that 255 
is the security level for the prime minister. 
 
 Sultan Sulu 












Figure 22. Prime minister’s security level. 
Figure 23 shows the security level game for Sultan Sulu. The red arrows represent 
Sultan Sulu’s efforts to maximize his payoff, while the blue arrows are the prime 
minister’s efforts to minimize Sultan Sulu’s payoff. The result shows that 267 is the 
security level for Sultan Sulu. 
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  Sultan Sulu 












Figure 23. Sultan Sulu’s security level. 
Figure 24 shows the security level of both players on a graph to produce SQ, 
which is closer to the center of line joining Outcome 4 and Outcome 1. There is a 50 
percent probability for both players to choose either violence (Outcome 4) or peace 
(Outcome 1) solution. 
 
 




 C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The game theory model shows that the most probable strategy in this case study is 
for the prime minister to employ Assault, while Sulu Sultan employs Fight as their 
solution to the crisis. This result is a justification that both players could not avoid 
violence to resolve the crisis.   
The result also highlights that players do not necessarily go for their maximum 
payoff when the interaction with other player is taken into account. In the case study 
game, the prime minister’s best payoff is in Outcome 2 where prime minister to play 
Assault strategy and for Sultan Sulu to Leave, but it turns out the best solution is for the 
prime minister to employ Assault and for Sultan Sulu to employ the Fight strategy. This 
shows that the proposed decision-making model offers detailed consideration to produce 
a precise solution. It also shows that the proposed decision-making model can offer 
insight into the Malaysian Prime Minister’s decision by objectively structuring the 
exploration of possible environmental factors and interactions.  
The sensitivity analysis shows that the introduction of external institutions inputs 
suggests a different result from the case study game. It suggests that there is a possibility 
for fair negotiation in Sabah standoff case, which would avoid violence action from both 
players. This indicates that different inputs in the initial phase of the model framework 
could change the result in later phases of the framework accordingly. This shows that 
these combined tools are sensitive to inputs and robust to accommodate the “what if” 
consideration.   
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 VI. CONCLUSION 
Our proposed model demonstrated the viability of the combined application of 
PESTEL, AHP and game theory. PESTEL analysis provided us with the macro 
environmental framework in structuring our search for the criteria of decision making for 
both players, i.e., the Malaysian Prime Minister and Sultan Sulu. We have successfully 
incorporated AHP to compensate for the game theory’s weaknesses, as AHP is well 
known as a credible tool that translates qualitative criteria into a quantitative judgment. 
We analyzed the interactive decision-making process of the prime minister and Sultan 
Sulu using game theory, and found out that the players do not necessarily go for their 
maximum payoff when the interaction with the other player is taken into account.  
We checked the viability of the model by its ability to help us better understand 
the dynamics behind the decision-making process of the Malaysian Prime Minister and 
Sultan Sulu in this case study of the Lahad Datu standoff. The research offered valuable 
insights into the crisis through the interactive decision-making process perspective, with 
consideration of macro environmental factors affecting both players. It also identified key 
elements that influenced the action of both players. Most importantly, our research 
provides a proposed structural framework, which can effectively be used for choosing the 
most appropriate course of action in any conflict situation. Moreover, we used sensitivity 
analysis to validate the robustness of the model. 
The advantages of the combined model are that it mitigates the weaknesses in the 
individual applications of PESTEL, AHP, and game theory; and it conveniently uses 
them in support of each other to provide a viable, efficient, and robust framework. This 
framework not only helps us in better understanding the past, but can help remove mental 
fog when we are confronted by a decision situation. This not only helps structure 
scattered thoughts and make decisions more informed, but also provides an historical 
record for accountability and learning purposes. 
The broad applications of this model are twofold: to study past situations and 
learn valid lessons, and to respond effectively when faced with a decision dilemma. The 
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 proposed is a generic model of decision making, which can be used in any conflict 
situation. Its strength lies in its flexibility to accommodate all kinds of players and 
situations, from national crises to personal relationships.  
We have seen the expansion of domains in PESTEL in an attempt to make it 
comprehensive. Further research can contemplate fusing ethical theories with PESTEL to 
broaden the scope of analysis. Another domain to include is the irrational value into the 
calculation. We also foresee a future study on the most probable common critical 
decision criteria used by decision makers especially during conflict, either individual or 
group focused. These identified critical decision making criteria could assist a decision 
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